Loan syndication under Basel II: How firm credit ratings affect the cost of credit? by Hasan, Iftekhar et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Loan syndication under Basel II: How
firm credit ratings affect the cost of
credit?
Hasan, Iftekhar and Kim, Suk-Joong and Politsidis,
Panagiotis and Wu, Eliza
June 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102796/
MPRA Paper No. 102796, posted 13 Sep 2020 20:00 UTC
  
 
Loan syndication under Basel II:  
How firm credit ratings affect the cost of credit? 
 
 
 
Iftekhar Hasan 
Fordham University and the University of Sydney 
ihasan@fordham.edu 
 
 
Suk-Joong Kim 
The University of Sydney 
sukjoong.kim@sydney.edu.au 
 
 
Panagiotis N. Politsidis 
The University of Sydney 
panagiotis.politsidis@sydney.edu.au 
 
 
Eliza Wu 
The University of Sydney 
eliza.wu@sydney.edu.au 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We are grateful for comments, suggestions, and discussions with Mauricio Calani, Manthos Delis, 
Dimitrios Gounopoulos, Andrew Grant, Anya Kleymenova, Lantian Lang, Haekwon Lee, Richard 
Philip, Buhui Qiu, and Cyril Pouvelle. The paper was presented at the 9th International Conference of 
the Financial Engineering and Banking Society (FEBS), the 3rd Sydney Banking and Financial Stability 
Conference (SBFC), and the 27th Annual Conference of the Multinational Finance Society. The paper 
was also presented at the University of Sydney. The paper was previously circulated under the title 
“When it still pays to borrow if downgraded: Firm credit ratings and ratings-based regulation”. We 
acknowledge financial support for this research from the Australian Research Council (DP170101413).
  
 
Loan syndication under Basel II:  
How firm credit ratings affect the cost of credit? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how lenders react to borrowers’ rating changes under heterogeneous 
conditions and different regulatory regimes. Our findings suggest that corporate downgrades 
that increase capital requirements for lending banks under the Basel II framework are 
associated with increased loan spreads and deteriorating non-price loan terms relative to 
downgrades that do not affect capital requirements. Ratings exert an asymmetric impact on 
loan spreads, as these remain unresponsive to rating upgrades, even when the latter are 
associated with a reduction in risk weights for corporate loans. The increase in firm borrowing 
costs is mitigated in the presence of previous bank-firm lending relationships and for borrowers 
with relatively strong performance, high cash flows and low leverage.  
 
 
Keywords: corporate credit ratings, cost of credit, rating-contingent regulation, capital 
requirements, Basel II 
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1. Introduction 
Credit ratings play an important role in various financing channels within the economy by 
providing investors with the information necessary to gauge the credit quality of financial-
instrument issuers. Commercial banks, on the other hand, have traditionally conducted their 
own risk assessments of the credit quality of their borrowers and other investments and, thus, 
third-party credit ratings have been less valuable. However, the adoption of ratings-contingent 
capital regulation since 2004 as part of the Basel II Accord, which includes significant roles 
for third-party rating providers, changed the scene fundamentally. Banks have since been 
required to hold a sufficient level of capital against risky assets in their portfolios and, under 
Basel II, the appropriate risk weights to apply to their assets are largely determined by external 
rating agencies. 
Changes in borrowers’ credit ratings may alter risk weights on bank loans under ratings-
contingent capital regulation, thereby posing a direct impact on lending banks’ capital 
requirements and the cost of financial intermediation. It is likely that the sensitivity of banks’ 
responses to borrowers’ rating changes would be much higher for banks located in countries 
that already adopted the ratings-contingent regulation under Basel II in the mid to late 2000s. 
Evidence suggests that sovereign credit ratings have a significant impact not only on 
international bank flows (e.g., Hasan, Kim, and Wu, 2015) but also on syndicated loan pricing 
(e.g., Adelino and Ferreira, 2016, Drago and Gallo, 2017). This study aims to shed new light 
on the impact of the staggered national adoption of Basel II ratings-contingent capital rules on 
syndicated bank loan contracting and structuring strategies. 
In this paper, we examine all syndicated loan facilities over the period from 1998 to 
2016 (27,396 facilities) granted by 528 lead lenders from 23 countries to borrowers from 63 
countries. These data are ideal for our setting because (i) they are at the loan-level, thereby 
enabling the adequate identification of causal effects, (ii) include loans from several banks to 
2 
 
several firms in several countries, (iii) provide information about several loan characteristics, 
and (iv) can be matched with sovereign and corporate credit ratings prior to loan origination. 
We address the following main research questions: First, how important are borrowing firm 
credit ratings for syndicated loan spreads and other lending syndicate characteristics? Second, 
are there asymmetric responses to firm rating upgrades and downgrades? Third, to what extent 
has the adoption of Basel II, especially capital requirements mapped to the risk weights of 
loans, impacted the strategies of international loan syndicates? Fourth, have the strategic 
responses of international loan syndicates affected the profitability and operating performance 
of downgraded firms? Lastly, what borrower characteristics mitigate the negative impact of 
rating downgrades in bank loan contracting?  
Our findings are summarized as follows: First, loan spreads respond significantly to 
borrowing firms’ rating events. We find that lenders are concerned only about the deterioration 
of borrowers’ ratings and respond to them by raising spreads when rating downgrades also 
increase lenders’ applicable Basel II risk weights. This evidence suggests that the adoption of 
Basel II in lender countries directly affects loan pricing when borrowers’ credit conditions 
change and thereby induce higher capital charges.  
Second, the impact of the Basel II risk-weight requirement is significant only for non-
US lenders bound by the Basel Accord. On the other hand, only US lenders respond 
significantly to spreads for undrawn facilities, especially when rating changes also change 
borrowers’ Basel II risk weights. This finding is consistent with Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and 
Streitz (2017), where credit-line usage is found to be much more extensive for US banks than 
for their European counterparts.  
Third, a borrower country’s sovereign credit rating is also important, in addition to firm 
ratings. The interaction of sovereign rating downgrades with firm downgrades results in a 
significant increase in bank loan spreads, especially during the post-Basel II adoption period 
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and for those rating changes with risk-weight increases. Fourth, we find that firm rating 
downgrades have a significant impact on firm performance. Downgraded borrowers experience 
worse borrowing conditions, as evidenced by larger spreads, higher collateral requirements and 
shorter maturities, all of which lead to a deterioration in firm performance.  
Fifth, increases in bank loan spreads following firm downgrades is mostly offset when 
borrowers have had a prior relationship with lenders (i.e., have previously borrowed from 
them), especially when such downgrades increase risk weights. We conjecture that lenders will 
be more lenient with their corporate borrowers when a pre-existing relationship exists, since 
they have special access to information via relationship lending and, thus, have a better 
understanding of such borrowers’ business conditions.1 They would, therefore, be more willing 
to absorb regulatory costs and be less concerned about borrowers’ higher default risk levels. 
Overall, we find that, although downgrades generally lead to higher loan spreads, firms 
with a previous relationship with their lenders, strong performance and less debt are affected 
less than other firms by credit downgrades. Our findings have strong policy implications for 
the effectiveness of ratings-contingent regulation. The real economic impacts of ratings-
contingent bank regulation is evidently strongest where the regulation is most needed to curb 
banks’ credit risk exposures to fundamental deteriorations in the credit quality of the most 
opaque borrowers.   
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related reaserch 
and highlights our connection to the literature, Section 3 describes the dataset and the empirical 
methodology, Sections 4-6 present the investigation results regarding the impact of firm rating 
changes on syndicated loan spreads and other syndicate characteristics, as well as on firm 
performance, and identify potential remedies for the increased cost of credit. Section 7 provides 
concluding remarks. 
                                                 
1
 For more, see Balasubramanyan, Berger, and Koepke (2019). 
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2. Literature review 
The crucial role of corporate and sovereign credit rating changes for the smooth operation of 
the economic and financial system is well documented. Corporate ratings affect the prices of 
the major financial asset prices (e.g., bonds, stocks, and CDS), with downgrades constituting a 
fundamental driver of credit spreads and CDS spreads (see Hull, Predescu, and White, 2004; 
Kräussl, 2005; Micu, Remolona, and Wooldridge, 2006; Norden and Weber, 2004). Corporate 
ratings are further material for management decisions on the optimum level of capital structure, 
debt and equity financing (see Kisgen, 2006, 2009; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010), while also affect 
firm performance and investment (see Almeida, Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo, 2017; 
Chernenko and Sunderam 2012; Lemmon and Roberts 2010; Sufi 2009; Tang 2009). 
We complement the above studies by documenting how corporate credit ratings are 
incorporated into bank lending decisions and materialize into higher borrowing costs for the 
downgraded firms. Importantly, we disentangle the effect of credit ratings from that of ratings-
contingent regulation and show the difference on bank lending practices since the adoption of 
the Basel II Accord. Given the economic importance of bank loans in allocating capital to 
corporations, we further identify the interplay of corporate credit ratings and regulatory reforms 
as an essential determinant of bank lending decisions; other determinants include the 
independence of corporate boards (see Francis, Hasan, Koetter, and Wu, 2012), the impact of 
firm earnings predictability (see Hasan, Park, and Wu, 2012) and the bank’s capitalization 
levels (see Claessens, Law, and Wang, 2018). 
Sovereign credit rating downgrades constitute an important determinant of corporate 
downgrades and overall firm credit risk (see Augustin, Boustanifar, Breckenfelder, and 
Schnitzler, 2018; Bedendo and Colla, 2015; Ferri Liu, and Majnoni, 2001) and further have 
negative spillovers on international financial markets (see Drago and Gallo, 2016; Gande and 
5 
 
Parsley, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007). The emergence of the sovereign-bank nexus during 
the recent European sovereign debt crisis confirmed that the banking sector constitutes the 
main channel for the transmission of sovereign risk to the economy. Through the bank’s high 
exposures to troubled Eurozone countries sovereign debt, the negative developments at the 
sovereign level where transmitted to the domestic banking sector and ultimately to the domestic 
economy due to the reduced bank lending supply (see Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch, 
2018; Becker and Ivashina, 2014; Drago and Gallo, 2016; Popov and Van Horen, 2015). 
In this setting, our study further distinguishes between the differential effect of 
sovereign and corporate credit ratings on bank lending decisions and firm borrowing costs and 
highlights the negative externalities connected with ratings-based regulation in the event of 
concurrent sovereign and corporate downgrades. For what matters, these changes result in 
higher borrowing costs for the affected firms following the transition to the Basel II era. 
Finally, our study contributes to the literature on the bank lending channel. Previous 
evidence suggests that shocks to bank financial positions reduce liquidity supply across banks 
with a consequent impact on the real economic activity (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Black 
and Strahan 2002; Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein 1994. In this regard, the 2007-2008 credit 
crunch and the resulting global financial crisis have been used as natural experiments to 
examine the impact of bank distress on the supply of credit and firm real outcomes (see, e.g., 
Carvalho, Ferreira, and Matos, 2015; Chodorow-Reich 2014; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and 
Tehranian, 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010; Iyer, Peydró, da-Rocha-Lopes, and Schoar, 
2014; Santos 2011). Other experimental settings include that of Adelino and Ferreira (2016), 
who exploit the asymmetric impact of sovereign downgrades on bank credit ratings due to the 
rating agencies’ sovereign ceiling rule. This asymmetric impact, leads to greater reductions in 
ratings-sensitive funding and lending of banks bounded by their sovereign’s rating relative to 
other banks. 
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We document how corporate credit ratings are transmitted to the bank lending channel 
and whether shocks to the firm’s financial position are eventually reflected into their borrowing 
decisions and real economic activity. Furthermore, we identify potential remedies that help 
mitigate the adverse impact of corporate downgrades. These remedies which concern specific 
firm traits (relating to certain levels of profitability and leverage) and the formation of lending 
relationships, enable the downgraded firms to obtain bank financing without being subject to 
additional penalties (in the form of high interest rate premia and other non-price loan terms) 
due to the downgrade event.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
We obtain data from three sources. We obtain syndicated loan facilities (the unit of our 
analysis) from DealScan, which includes the most comprehensive and historical loan-deal 
information available on the global syndicated loan market. Our examination period is from 
1998 to 2016. We omit all loans for which there is no information on loan pricing (i.e., there is 
no interest spread) and this effectively removes all types of Islamic finance and very specialized 
credit lines. We match corporate loans with borrowers’ credit ratings on their long-term foreign 
currency debt and with their sovereigns’ credit ratings. We consider credit ratings provided by 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) as the ratings literature has shown that S&P is more active and their 
ratings are revised more frequently, usually ahead of other CRAs (see Alsakka, ap Gwilym, 
and Vu, 2014; Badar and Shen, 2019; Drago and Gallo, 2017; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). 
We further match loans with bank- and firm-specific information from Compustat, as well as 
with macroeconomic and institutional (country-year) variables from several freely available 
sources. The number of loan facilities for our baseline specifications ranges from 27,317 to 
27,396, depending on the set of control variables used. These loans are arranged by 528 lead 
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lenders headquartered in 23 countries and for 3,989 borrowers from 63 countries (see Table 1 
for key descriptive statistics). 
 
3.1. Control variables 
We use a number of control variables at the loan-facility level and, importantly, fixed-effect 
estimations (see Table A1 for details). Following prior studies on syndicated bank loans (Delis, 
Hasan, and Ongena, 2020; Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang, 2017; Ivashina, 2009 among others), 
we control for loan amount (Loan amount), loan duration (Maturity), collateral (Collateral), 
number of lender banks in the syndicate (Number of lenders), number of financial and general 
covenants in the loan contract (General covenants), and performance-pricing provisions 
(Performance provisions). Although not explicitly priced, these non-price terms have a 
material impact on how loan and syndicate structures are formed. For example, lenders may 
lean toward making loans with more loan guarantees and lower direct costs following a 
corporate and/or sovereign upgrade (see Deli, Delis, Hasan, and Liu, 2018; Kim, 2019).  
We also control for bank characteristics with banks’ return on assets (Bank return on 
assets), total assets (Bank size), and non-performing loans (NPLs). Our firm controls include 
firms’ return on assets (Firm return on assets), Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q), and firm leverage (Firm 
leverage). We include country-pair-specific variables, such as the difference in GDP per capita 
between a lender’s and a borrower’s country (GDP per capita), or the difference in their GDP 
growth (GDP growth) rates to account for the relative differences in their economic 
development and macroeconomic environments. 
Finally, we also include fixed effects based on the purpose of the loan (e.g., corporate 
purposes, working capital, takeovers or acquisitions, debt repayment), where we further 
distinguish between term loans and lines of credit. We also include year, bank, firm, lender’s 
country, borrower’s country, and country-pair fixed effects. These fixed effects are intended to 
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capture any remaining effects on loan spreads stemming from the bank, firm, macroeconomic, 
or general country-specific characteristics not isolated by the inclusion of our set of control 
variables. 
 
3.2. Empirical identification 
The general form of the empirical model is: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡                                                 (1) 
 
In equation (1), Cost of credit measures the cost of loan facility l originated at time t. The most 
widely used measure is the all-in-spread-drawn (AISD), denoting the spread over LIBOR. Berg, 
Saunders, and Steffen (2016) further show the importance of fees in the overall pricing of loans. 
Hence, for robustness, we also consider, as an alternative cost measure, the all-in-spread-
undrawn (AISU), which is the sum of facility and commitment fees. The vector 𝑎0 denotes 
different types of fixed effects, described above. Controls is a vector of control variables of a 
different dimension k, and u is a stochastic disturbance. 
Firm rating is the change in the firm’s numerical credit rating in the year before the 
loan facility start year. Consistent with the ratings literature, lower (higher) numerical credit 
ratings are associated with a higher (lower) credit rating and, therefore, larger values of this 
variable reflect a deterioration in a firm’s creditworthiness (Table A1 provides information on 
firm credit ratings and their conversions to numerical credit ratings and risk-weighting 
categories). This, in turn, forms our primary variable of interest. We expect the coefficient 𝑎1 
on Firm rating to be positive and significant if a deterioration in the firm’s credit rating is 
incorporated in the determination of the interest rate on the firm’s loans. In other words, firms 
face increasing borrowing costs following a rise in their credit risk.  
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We also distinguish between positive and negative changes in Firm rating by 
constructing the indicator variables Firm downgrade and Firm upgrade respectively, and 
sequentially replacing Firm rating as the primary independent variable in our baseline 
specification. This allows us to identify potential asymmetries with regard to the impact of 
corporate credit ratings on the cost of credit. Such differentiation is imperative since rating 
cycles are strongly asymmetric, i.e., the length and depth (duration and amplitude) of upgrade 
and downgrade phases are very different (see Broto, and Molina, 2016; Koopman, Krussl, 
Lucas, and Monteiro, 2009, for evidence on sovereign credit ratings). The literature reports that 
the downgrade periods tend to be shorter than those for upgrades, so we expect credit rating 
downgrades to exert a greater impact on loan spreads compared to rating upgrades.  
To explicitly examine the effects of Basel II ratings-based capital requirements, we 
directly investigate the effects of the borrowing firm credit rating changes that lead to changes 
in risk-weight categories under Basel capital rules and those that do not. In this respect, we 
classify every downgrade (upgrade) into a change or non-change in the firm’s risk-weight 
category. The resulting binary variables, Firm RW and Firm NRW, assume the value of one 
when the rating change leads to the crossing and non-crossing of risk-weight categories 
respectively, and zero otherwise. We then consider the separate interactions of Firm rating 
(and sequentially Firm downgrade, and Firm upgrade) with Firm RW and Firm NRW 
respectively. Thus, in later stages our specification is of the form: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑊𝑘𝑡−1 + 
                   + 𝑎2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑁𝑅𝑊𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝑎3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡                         (2)         
 
Under the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II, risk weights used to calculate 
capital charges are directly mapped to credit ratings and, thus, rating changes across predefined 
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rating categories will necessarily lead to changes in the risk weights applied (Hasan, Kim, and 
Wu, 2015).2 As such, we expect rating changes that force the borrowing firm to move to a 
different risk-weight category to exert a stronger effect on loan spreads relative to rating 
changes that leave the corporate entity in the same risk-weight category. Hence, we anticipate 
the estimated coefficient 𝑎1 to be not only positive but also greater in absolute value than the 
coefficient estimate for 𝑎2.  
 
4. The effect of credit rating changes on the cost of credit 
4.1. Baseline results 
In Table 2 we report the results from the estimation of equation (1) using OLS and a different 
set of fixed effects, the most stringent contribution being that in column (4), where all the fixed 
effects are included. We use these regressions to analyze the impact of corporate credit rating 
changes on their cost of credit. We report coefficient estimates and t-statistics, obtained from 
standard errors clustered by firm. The general finding is that deteriorating corporate credit 
ratings (as reflected by a positive value in Firm rating) positively and significantly affect loan 
price terms, both statistically and economically. 
Specifically, the coefficient on Firm rating is statistically significant at the 1% level 
across all specifications. A one-notch downgrade in the firm’s credit rating increases AISD by 
approximately 6.3-7.5 basis points (bps). These effects are economically large and are 
attributable to both the increasing loan demand of the firms following their rating deterioration 
and the risk-aversion of the banks. According to model specification (3), which constitutes our 
baseline specification, the effect is sizeable and is equal to a 3.2% increase for the average loan 
                                                 
2
 Under both Basel II and Basel III, credit ratings provided by recognized credit rating agencies are employed in 
the calculation of minimum capital requirements for banks and, therefore, impose operational constraints for 
investment funds and financial institutions; in other words, credit rating agencies provide a “certification” service 
for debt issuers (Kiff, Nowak, and Schumacher, 2012). 
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in our sample. Given that the average loan size is $669 million, firms experiencing a decrease 
in their credit rating would, on average, pay approximately USD 0.43 million 
(=$669,000,000 × 6.4 bps) more per year in interest expense. Moreover, for an average loan 
maturity of 4.13 years, this represents approximately USD 1.77 million in extra interest paid 
over the duration of the loan.3 Considering that every firm in our sample receives, on average, 
1.83 loans per year, then the overall borrowing costs arising from the firm’s total syndicated 
bank loans rises to USD 3.24 million (=$1.77 × 1.83 loans). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In Table 3, we separately consider credit rating downgrades and upgrades, by re-
estimating our baseline specification. In column (1), we interact Firm rating with Firm 
downgrade dummy to evaluate the differential effect of credit rating downgrades on syndicated 
loan spreads. The coefficient on Firm rating is no longer significant, but the interaction term 
picks up the significance. This suggests that the positive effect of credit rating changes on loan 
spreads, documented in Table 2, is driven by credit rating downgrades; the coefficient on Firm 
rating × Firm downgrade dummy indicates that a corporate downgrade raises AISD by 
approximately 7.8 basis points.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
This asymmetric effect of corporate downgrades on loan spreads is further verified 
when we replace Firm rating as the main explanatory variable in our baseline specification 
with Firm downgrade (column 2) and Firm upgrade (column 3). Estimates from column (2) 
indicate that corporate downgrades directly increase loan spreads. In fact, a rating downgrade 
now raises spreads by almost 8.9 basis points, or an increase of 39%, according to our baseline 
estimate on the impact of a general rating change, as reflected in the coefficient on Firm rating 
                                                 
3
 Assuming five annual payments and LIBOR as the discount rate, the increase in interest expense equals USD 
1.66 million for an average 12-month LIBOR rate of 2.8% during our sample period (for similar calculations, see 
Ivashina and Sun, 2011). 
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in column (3) of Table 2. This effect is not observed when upgrades are considered (column 
3). Thus, we confirm that only downgrades are important for firms’ borrowing cost.  
This result questions the credit rating agencies’ (CRAs) information-advantage 
hypothesis, according to which CRAs possess information not available to the markets. Indeed, 
if a credit rating change could in practice introduce new information, we would expect to 
observe a significant change in loan spreads regardless of the direction of the change 
(downgrade or upgrade). Instead, the asymmetric impacts revealed in our analyses suggest that 
the corporate credit rating policy associated with downgrades is the most relevant factor for the 
determination of loan spreads observed after a credit rating event. 
In Appendix Table A3 we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to different types of 
loan, bank, firm, and macro controls. In columns 1-3 we confirm that our results are not subject 
to the “bad-controls” problem, by interchangeably excluding loan-level control variables from 
our specifications.4 We initially omit all loan-level variables (column 1), and consequently we 
include only variables that provide quantitative information on the loan, such as Loan amount, 
Maturity, and Collateral (column 2), or variables that include qualitative information, such as 
Number of lenders,  Performance provisions, and General covenants (column 3).5  
In the subsequent specifications (4-6), we gradually include different controls at the 
bank-, firm-, and macro-levels. These controls include the bank’s equity to total assets (Bank 
capital in column 4), the log of the firm’s total assets (Firm size in column 5), and the balance 
of trade between lenders’ and borrowers’ countries as well as their difference in inflation rates 
(Trade balance and Inflation in column 6). Regardless of the specifications employed, the 
coefficient on Firm rating retains its negative and statistically significant value. In fact, its 
                                                 
4
 Since the “bad-controls” problem occurs due to differences in the composition of loans to a given firm, in an 
alternative sensitivity test we include weights based on the number and amount of loans received by each firm 
(these unreported results are available upon request). 
5
 The replacement (or addition) of General covenants with Financial covenants or Net covenants leaves our results 
unchanged. 
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magnitude is even stronger, ranging between 6.5 and 7.8 basis points, which confirms the 
higher cost of corporate loans following a deterioration in the firm’s credit rating.6  
The size and magnitude of coefficients on the control variables shown in Tables 2-3 
and Appendix Table A3 are generally in line with our expectations and with the studies of 
Ivashina (2009), Bae and Goyal (2009), Cai, Saunders, and Steffen (2018), and Delis, Hasan, 
and Ongena (2020), and others. Specifically, loan spreads decrease with larger loans and 
increase with maturity. However, loan rates are complementary collateral requirements. We 
further observe that loans are more competitively priced when more performance provisions 
and general covenants are included. The behavior of bank-level variables is also largely 
anticipated. In this regard, a higher return on bank assets is associated with decreasing AISD, 
while an increase in the bank’s non-performing loans is associated with higher loan spreads. 
Unsurprisingly, firms achieving higher returns on their assets and high market-to-book-value 
ratios have access to lower spreads; the latter increase with the firm’s leverage. 
 
4.2. Risk weight changes and the role of Basel II 
Thus far we have provided evidence that corporate credit rating changes have significant 
effects, both statistically and economically, on loan spreads. We further differentiate between 
downgrades and upgrades and find that the asymmetric impact is exerted by the former. We 
now direct our focus to whether these effects are attributable to rating-based regulation. To this 
end, in Table 4 we estimate equation (2) with further interactions, i.e., double interaction terms 
with a Basel II dummy, which will enable us to consider whether the impact of changes in risk-
weight categories is magnified when moving to the Basel II period. Since it is debatable 
whether the U.S. implemented Basel II in practice or migrated directly to Basel III, we 
                                                 
6
 In all subsequent estimations we employ these sets of bank-, firm-, and macro-controls interchangeably. 
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distinguish between loans from non-US lenders and loans from lenders headquartered in the 
U.S.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 When the full sample is considered (column 1), we observe that loan spreads react only 
to rating changes that lead to a change in risk-weighting category. The coefficient on Firm 
rating × Firm RW is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that every rating change 
that causes the firm to move into a higher risk-weight category results in an approximately 5.8-
basis-point increase in the firm’s loan spread. However, irrespective of their impact on risk-
weight categories, rating changes are significant in the post-Basel II sample (positive 
coefficients on the triple interaction terms). Since a large part of our sample includes loans 
granted by US banks, we need to distinguish between the countries of origin of bank loans. 
Thus, in column (2), we estimate the same specification for the sample of syndicated bank 
loans from non-US banks. We find that the non-US banks price only the rating changes that 
alter borrowing firms’ risk weights and only in the post-Basel II period (coefficient on Firm 
rating × Firm RW × Basel II). The increase is equal to 11.6 bps, almost double the loan-pricing 
effect in our baseline specification. The importance of risk-weight changes for AISD is further 
verified for loans granted by US banks, regardless of whether these loans are directed to all 
firms or solely to US firms (coefficient on Firm rating × Firm RW in columns 3 and 4 
respectively). Most importantly, this appears to be independent of the transition to Basel II 
capital rules, which in turn indicates that the ratings-contingent regulation has not been 
incorporated into the lending activities of US banks. 
 Having established the sensitivity of loan spreads to the ratings-contingent regulation 
introduced under the Basel regulatory framework, we further examine the asymmetric nature 
of this sensitivity by differentiating between corporate downgrades and upgrades. We thus re-
estimate Table 4, by replacing Firm rating with Firm downgrade and Firm upgrade, 
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respectively. Results are presented in Table 5 and indicate that the asymmetry evidenced in 
section 4.1 is further preserved when we consider the role of ratings-based regulation. 
Specifically, estimates from the examination of the full sample point to a significant sensitivity 
of AISD to a combination of corporate downgrades and changes in risk-weight categories since 
the implementation of Basel II (coefficients on Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Basel II and 
Firm upgrade × Firm RW × Basel II in columns 1 and 5, respectively). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 However, our results highlight differences in the reaction of loan spreads depending on 
the country of the lender. Spreads on loans granted from non-US lenders (column 2), exhibit 
an increased sensitivity to corporate downgrades that also results in changes in the firm’s risk-
weight category. This phenomenon is specifically observed during the post-Basel II period and 
is approximately 2.3 times the gross change when not differentiating between changes in non-
risk-weight changes (see specification 2 in Table 3). Non-US bank-originated loans further 
display an asymmetric response to credit rating changes, as they remain stable to all types of 
corporate upgrades (column 6). 
 This asymmetry is nevertheless not observed when considering loans granted by US 
lenders: AISD responds to either corporate downgrades and upgrades that lead to a change in a 
firm’s risk weight (coefficient on Firm downgrade × Firm RW in columns 3-4 and 7-8, 
respectively). In this respect, corporate downgrades (upgrades) can apparently ease borrowing 
costs for international firms that borrow from US banks (columns 3 and 7) or for US firms that 
borrow domestically (columns 4 and 8). Overall, Tables 4-5 point to the asymmetric impact of 
changes in risk-weight categories for both non-US and US lenders. The major difference is that 
with the former, this asymmetry occurs during the Basel II period, while with the latter, its 
presence is independent of the change in the capital regulatory regime. 
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4.3. Interaction between corporate and sovereign credit rating changes 
An integral part of our analysis is the examination of whether a sovereign rating change in the 
borrower’s country has a significant impact on firms’ borrowing costs, particularly when 
occurring concurrently with a corporate credit rating change. If a sovereign downgrade is 
important for the pricing of loan contracts, we would expect it to raise the cost of debt for that 
country’s firms. We examine this contingency in Table 6, where we interact each of our credit 
rating variables (i.e., Firm rating, Firm downgrade, and Firm upgrade) with a change in the 
borrower country’s credit rating (Sov rating). To assess the impact of rating-contingent 
regulation, we further include the triple interactions with the change or non-change in the 
sovereign’s risk weight (Sov RW and Sov NRW, respectively).  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 Estimates in columns 1-2 confirm the impact of a sovereign rating change on loan 
spreads from domestic firms’ perspective. This change is significant, however, only to the 
extent that it causes a change in the sovereign’s risk weight (coefficient on Firm rating × Sov 
rating × Sov RW in column 2). Next, we document that the asymmetric response of loan spreads 
to corporate credit ratings persists in the presence of sovereign credit rating changes. Estimates 
in column (3) suggest that a combination of corporate and sovereign credit rating change raises 
AISD by an additional 6.1 bps. Furthermore, column (4) reveals that this is driven, and even 
magnified, by sovereign rating changes that lead to changes in the sovereign’s risk-weight 
category (coefficient on Firm downgrade × Sov rating × Sov RW). This is intuitive, since a 
sovereign rating change (downgrade) does not only reflect an increase in the sovereign credit 
risk, but also further affects financial markets and the behavior of economic agents in general; 
it further points to the transmission of sovereign credit risk onto firms’ credit risk (see Bedendo 
and Colla, 2015; Drago and Gallo, 2017). Columns 5-6 confirm this asymmetric impact 
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between positive and negative rating changes: A corporate upgrade continues to have no effect 
on loan spreads, regardless of any movement in the borrower country’s credit rating. 
 In Table 7, we examine whether the influence of sovereign downgrades varies with the 
origin of the lending bank as well as when moving from the pre- to the post-Basel II period. 
This complements the analysis of section 4.2 and the evidence that corporate downgrades were 
only incorporated into non-US banks’ lending decisions post Basel II. Indeed, estimates from 
columns 5-8 reveal that, during the transition to the Basel II capital regime, changes in 
sovereign credit ratings magnify the impact of corporate downgrades on firms’ cost of credit 
(coefficients on Firm downgrade × Sov rating and Firm downgrade × Sov rating × Sov RW 
respectively). Most importantly, these changes in sovereign credit risk are only priced in loans 
granted by non-US banks, which stands in stark contrast to the minimal sensitivity of loan 
spreads before the implementation of Basel II (columns 1-4). We thus highlight the negative 
externalities connected with ratings-based regulation in the event of concurrent sovereign and 
corporate downgrades, which results in higher borrowing costs for the affected firms and when 
the latter borrow from non-US banks. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.4. Results using AISU  
An important extension of our analysis relates to the role of loan fees. According to Berg, 
Saunders, and Steffen (2016), commitment plus facility fees, defined as the all-in-spread-
undrawn (AISU), are larger for high-volatility firms. Thus, we might expect that riskier firms 
face higher borrowing costs through higher fees. A constraining factor of the global DealScan 
database is that the reporting of fees is limited, either because loan deals do not include 
specifications for undrawn funds or simply because such information is missing. Nevertheless, 
in Table 8 we replicate Table 2 with AISU as the dependent variable. Across all specifications, 
the coefficient on Firm rating is positive and statistically significant at all conventional levels, 
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raising AISU by approximately 1.3% (specification 3); therefore, we reveal that credit rating 
changes are further priced in the fees.7 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Along the lines of Table 5, we examine potential asymmetries in the response of AISU to credit 
rating and risk-weight changes during the pre- and post-Basel II implementation periods, while 
differentiating between international and US lenders. We present results in Table 9 and provide 
evidence of an asymmetric reaction of loan spreads on undrawn funds to corporate downgrades, 
only to the extent that such downgrades lead to a change in risk-weight category (coefficient 
on Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Basel II). Column 1 confirms this reaction for the full sample; 
however, columns 3-4 reveal that this practice is only followed by US lenders. The latter 
increase AISU by approximately three basis points, or 10.5%, in the post-Basel II period for 
borrowers experiencing a simultaneous downgrade and movement to a lower risk-weight 
category. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 On the other hand, columns 5-8 confirm that corporate upgrades have an insignificant 
effect on AISU. Taken together, estimates in Table 9 provide evidence of a differential pricing 
structure of undrawn funds between international and US lenders, which complements the 
finding that the pricing structure of lines of credit differs fundamentally between European and 
US syndicated loans (see Berg, Saunders, Steffen, and Streitz, 2017). According to our 
analysis, US lenders further adjust (upwards) their pricing of undrawn funds following a firm’s 
movement to a lower risk-weight category; this adjustment is only observed during the post-
Basel II period.  
 
                                                 
7
 We further estimate specifications 1-4 without the inclusion of AISD as a control variable. Results confirm the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on Firm rating, which is almost four times the coefficient presented 
in Table 8. In fact, a change in Firm rating now raises AISU by 1.22-1.45 basis points across all specifications. 
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4.5. Effect of credit rating changes on the other loan terms  
Our analysis further relates to the effect of corporate credit rating changes on additional loan 
terms. To this end, each of the specifications in Table 10 estimates our baseline regression by 
replacing AISD with alternative non-price loan terms, namely Loan amount, Maturity, and 
Collateral. Starting from column (1), we notice that a deterioration in the firm’s credit rating 
exerts a positive, albeit weakly significant, effect on loan amount. This finding is not entirely 
unexpected, as downgrades might constrain firms’ access to an alternative source of funding, 
causing them to resort to syndicated loan financing. Consequently, we observe that a change 
in credit rating reduces loan duration (column 2).  
 Our last specification examines the effect of Firm rating on collateral requirements 
(column 3). It is evident that loans to firms experiencing an adverse rating change are more 
likely to require collateral. Moreover, in Appendix Table A5 we document that, similar to loan 
spreads, Collateral also exhibits an asymmetric response to credit rating changes. In particular, 
the use of collateral is intensified after corporate downgrades and risk-weight changes; this is 
observed post-Basel II and concerns lenders headquartered outside the US (positive coefficient 
on Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Basel II in column 2). We find that, in the Basel II regime, 
collateral is the non-price term that is readily adjusted by non-US banks, while AISD is used to 
price in the higher regulatory costs for lending activities. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
4.6. Robustness Checks 
Thus far our results could be subject to a sample-selection bias, in the sense that the variables 
driving our findings might further determine the firm’s decision to receive a loan from a 
specific bank. It may be, for instance, that loan spreads are impacted by corporate downgrades 
because high-credit-risk firms are  more likely than others to request a loan. To address this 
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potential selection bias, we follow Dass and Massa (2011) and employ Heckman’s (1979) two-
stage model to calculate first the probability of a firm entering into a loan deal. In the first stage, 
we run a probit model to estimate the firm’s loan-taking decision. During this stage, we extend 
our loan sample and include all syndicated loan facilities available in DealScan. We calculate 
Heckman’s lambda (inverse mills ratio) and include it as an additional control variable in the 
second-stage OLS estimation of model specifications 1-3 in Table 2. 
 In line with Dass and Massa (2011), we assume that the borrower’s decision to obtain 
a syndicated loan is a function of the main determinants of the decision to borrow in general. 
Consequently, our probit regression is augmented with a set of loan-, bank-, and firm-level 
characteristics; an indicator of whether the facility constitutes a term loan (Term loan); a set of 
weights for the number, origin, and direction of loans made in a given year; and loan purpose, 
year, bank, firm, lender’s and borrower’s country dummies. Our set of annual weights include 
the number of loans made by a given bank (Bank loans), the number of loans to a given firm 
(Firm loans), and the number of loans between a given matched bank-firm pair (Bank-firm 
loans). 
 We present results from this exercise in columns 1-3 of Appendix Table A6 (Panels A 
and B). Probit estimates (columns 1-3 of Panel A), reveal that the higher the return on assets, 
the Tobin’s Q and the size of the firm, the more likely is the completion of a syndicated loan 
deal. Loans of shorter maturity are more likely to be granted, particularly when these include 
collateral and carry pricing provisions and covenants. Importantly, estimates from the second-
stage regressions (columns 1-3 of Panel B) confirm the strong positive impact of credit rating 
changes on AISD. Furthermore, this impact is driven by corporate downgrades (columns 1-2), 
as corporate upgrades appear to be immaterial for loan spreads (column 3).  
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According to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, a positive relationship exists 
between expansionary monetary policy and bank risk taking.8 If low interest rates entice banks 
to assume greater risk positions, higher loan spreads might be attributed to within-year 
expansionary monetary policy. We test this premise by using a subsample consisting of the 
U.S., the Eurozone, Japan, and the UK. In these countries, we can better identify the stance of 
monetary policy, especially using measures encompassing non-conventional monetary policy. 
We consider the quarterly shadow short rate (Shadow rate), which provides a more accurate 
description of monetary policy when interest rates are near or below the zero-lower bound, 
compared to the actual short rate (Krippner, 2016; Von Borstel, Eickmeier, and Krippner, 
2016).  
 Results in Appendix Table A7 confirm the importance of risk-weight changes relative 
to non-changes, as well as the asymmetric effect exerted by rating downgrades. Furthermore, 
the coefficients on each of the interactions with Shadow rate are negative and significant, 
supporting the positive relation between expansionary monetary policy and bank loan rates 
(i.e., an operative risk-taking channel). These results are in line with Delis, Hasan, and 
Mylonidis (2017) and Paligorova and Santos (2017), who use syndicated loans to identify the 
risk-taking channel in the United States.9 
As a robustness check, in Appendix Table A8 we further confirm the insensitivity of 
our estimates to the type of clustering used for our standard errors; this is imperative due to the 
multi-level nature of our loan data. In this respect, we employ different specifications with 
standard errors clustered by loan facility, bank, bank and firm, firm and year, and bank and 
                                                 
8
 Evidence on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy is from, among others, Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and 
Saurina (2014), and Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis (2017). 
9
 We also experiment with specifications that include the shadow short rate, and where the clustering of standard 
errors is at the bank, firm, and year level. This is necessitated by the limited number of countries, which creates 
the need for more micro-clustering of standard errors. We further examine the hypothesis that loan spreads are 
driven by the interest-rate differential between the lender’s and the borrower’s countries. The results remain 
qualitatively the same. 
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firm and year. Across all specifications, estimates remain unchanged from our baseline results. 
In unreported specifications, standard errors are also clustered at lenders’ and borrowers’ 
country levels. 
Thus far, all loan deals enter our model with equal weights. Normally, the fielding of 
lenders’ and borrowers’ country fixed effects in all our specifications acts as a safeguard 
against cross-country variation. However, this allows certain countries or firms that receive 
relatively fewer loans to exert a disproportionate impact on our results. To this end, in 
Appendix Table A9 we re-estimate our preferred model specification using weighted least 
squares and employing alternative weights based on the number of loans granted by the bank 
(column 1), the number of loans received by the firm (column 2), the number of loans between 
the bank and the firm’s country (column 3), and the number of loans between the country-pair 
(column 4). Results from this approach are similar to those under the OLS method.  
Last, we control for differences stemming from the financial and institutional 
environment between banks’ and firms’ countries (see, e.g., Delis, Hasan, and Ongena, 2020). 
Specifically, we include financial and institutional country-pair controls (stock market 
capitalization, prevalence of democratic institutions, rule of law, protection of property and/or 
creditor rights, quality of bureaucracy) and characteristics of different financial sectors (bank 
vs. market systems). In theory, the slow-moving nature of these variables should cause them to 
correlate strongly with the country-pair fixed effects employed in model specification (4) in 
Table 2. Due to their high pair-wise correlations, we do not employ all variables 
simultaneously. Results from this exercise are similar to our baseline and are available on 
request. 
Lastly, we control for the timing of the downgrade event. Rating downgrades occurring 
shortly before or during loan negotiations might have a stronger effect on loan spreads since 
this information might not have been considered by the lending bank when determining loan 
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contract terms. Appendix Table A10 considers different frequencies for the timing of the event 
(daily, quarterly, bi-annually), with all alternative model specifications confirming the positive 
effect of corporate downgrades on the cost of corporate loans.  
 
5. Real effects for firms 
Thus far, our analysis shows that a firm faces higher borrowing costs if it experiences a rating 
downgrade that moves it into a higher risk-weight category under Basel capital rules. This 
phenomenon, however, is observed only for loans granted from banks after their countries 
implemented Basel II. Hence, a natural question arising is whether these higher borrowing 
costs affect the profitability and operating performance of downgraded firms. Since they are 
faced with increasing cost of bank credit following a deterioration in their credit worthiness, it 
is likely that such financially constrained firms will be forced to forego potentially profitable 
investments and experience a decline in their overall performance and profitability. 
It is reasonable to expect such an impact, since firms with a credit rating bounded by 
their sovereign credit rating, i.e., with a credit rating equal to the that of the country in which 
they are headquartered,  have been shown to cut corporate investments to a greater extent than 
those with non-bounded ratings in the aftermath of a sovereign downgrade (see Almeida, 
Cunha, Ferreira, and Restrepo, 2017), which is further reflected in a reduction in their net debt 
issuance and in an increase in equity issuance. Furthermore, deteriorating credit ratings can 
impact customer and employee relationships as well as business operations, including a firm’s 
ability to enter into or maintain long-term contracts. Because of these effects, firms appear to 
react to rating downgrades by reducing debt issuance and leverage (Kisgen, 2009; Kisgen and 
Strahan, 2010). 
In this regard, to allow us to trace the financial and real consequences of corporate 
downgrades that are most important for capital requirements, we examine whether corporate 
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downgrades and risk-weight changes are transmitted to the real economy through higher cost 
of credit in the country of the affected firms According to our estimates in Section 4, their 
asymmetric effect on cost of bank credit is found to be fairly strong. This will further enable 
us to identify the differential effect (if any) of the ratings-contingent regulation. Successful 
identification of the effect stemming from the higher cost of credit for downgraded firms on 
their operating performance and profitability lies in disentangling the corporate downgrade 
event from the increasing spreads on the affected firms’ loans.  
We conduct our analysis by collapsing our sample at the firm-year level and by 
interchangeably employing as dependent variables a number of different firm-level 
characteristics. We then perform a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation by interacting 
firms that experience a simultaneous downgrade and a change in their risk-weight category 
with the higher cost of bank credit faced by these firms following their downgrade. Our 
specification takes the following form: 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 
                               +𝑎3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 +                   
                               +𝑎4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                            (3) 
 
In equation (3), Firm performance measures the performance and profitability of a firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 as reflected in the firm’s cash flows and holdings, return on assets, total assets, and 
employee growth. Firm downgrade dummy is a binary variable that equals one for a downgrade 
in the firm’s risk-weight category 𝑡 − 1 (otherwise zero), while High borrowing rate is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the borrowing rate in the firm’s country is within the 75th 
percentile of the borrowing rate in our sample at time 𝑡 (otherwise zero). The specification 
further includes a vector of firm- and macroeconomic-level controls (Controls) and firm and 
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borrower’s country fixed effects (𝑎0). The coefficient on the interaction between Firm 
downgrade dummy and High borrowing rate (coefficient 𝑎3) is the main coefficient of interest 
and shows the differential effect of higher cost of bank credit on operating performance 
between firms experiencing a risk-weight category downgrade and those that do not.  
In other words, our  identification strategy rests upon the fact that a higher borrowing 
rate is associated with, and thus affects differently, firms that have experienced a risk-weight 
downgrade (the treatment group), compared to firms that were downgraded but remain in the 
same risk-weight category or were not downgraded at all (the control group). We expect that 
this coefficient will be positive if the higher cost of bank credit is transmitted to the real 
economy and thus affects the performance of downgraded firms. Moreover, the coefficient 𝑎1 
shows how the firm’s risk-weight-related downgrade affects firm performance, without 
accounting for the greater borrowing costs in its aftermath. If the model is well identified, the 
interaction term and the control variables should explain (most of) the effects of the firm’s risk-
weight-related downgrade on firm characteristics (i.e., 𝑎1 should be statistically insignificant), 
because the effect of the risk-weight change on firm performance should be minimal or zero, 
especially when controlling for the accompanying higher borrowing cost. 
Equation (3) is estimated twice, as we split the sample into the pre- and post-Basel II 
periods, respectively; we further estimate the same equation without the inclusion of the 
interaction term.  Results from the latter estimation are presented in Table 11 and confirm the 
detrimental effect of risk-weight changes on borrowing firms’ financial performance in the 
post-Basel II period. We consequently examine the differential effect of high borrowing costs 
faced by downgraded firms. Estimates in Table 12 provide evidence of the limited ability of 
our interaction term to affect firm performance before the implementation of Basel II (columns 
1-5). The only exception is column (4), where the firm appears to reduce its total assets in 
response to a combination of a risk-weight-related downgrade and higher borrowing cost. The 
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transition to the Basel II period, however, marks a rise in the ability of risk-weight downgrades 
to impede firm performance through a higher cost of credit (columns 6-10). The negative 
coefficient on the DiD term reveals that a risk-weight-related downgrade event and higher loan 
spreads reduce firms’ cash flows by almost 14.5 million and their cash holdings in proportion 
to total assets by 2.1 percentage points (columns 6-7). Moreover, affected firms that borrow at 
higher rates generate lower returns on their assets by 2.7 percentage points, while asset size 
also contracts (columns 8-9); this size shrinkage is almost 2.5 times that evidenced in the pre-
Basel II period. Last, firms re-adjust their hiring practices as reflected by the reduction in 
employee numbers (column 10).  
[Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here] 
 Overall, the results in this section suggest that corporate downgrades resulting in risk-
weight changes carry significant negative effects for firm performance and profitability due to 
the higher cost of bank credit following the downgrade event. Firms facing increasing loan 
spreads after a simultaneous credit rating and risk-weight-related downgrade are more strongly 
affected compared to downgraded firms that manage to maintain their cost of credit at a 
relatively low level. These adverse real effects for firms are evident only in the period following 
the implementation of Basel II. We thus highlight the fact that the ratings-contingent regulation 
involves competitive disadvantages for downgraded firms that are apparent in the form of lower 
operating cash flows and profitability, and further reduce employee numbers and thus overall 
firm size. 
 
6. When it pays to borrow 
The analysis in Sections 4 and 5 provides evidence of significant borrowing costs for 
downgraded firms in the post-Basel II period. These costs are further magnified when firms 
migrate to a higher risk-weight category. Moreover, affected firms experience a deterioration 
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in their performance, a direct consequence of the higher borrowing cost of bank credit 
following their downgrade. Having established that effect of a credit rating downgrade, in this 
section, we perform a number of tests to identify how firms can alleviate these adverse 
borrowing costs and are able to borrow at competitive rates after a downgrade event. 
 
6.1. Relationship lending 
Prior relationships between banks and borrowing firms allow the former to acquire valuable 
information about the latter’s operations and credit-risk level. It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that firms with prior loan relationships with their lending banks are able to recover part 
of the higher loan spread following a downgrade in their credit rating. Indeed the literature 
shows that there are benefits for both the lenders and the borrowers. According to Bharath, 
Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007), lenders are much more likely to make future loans 
to previoUS borrowers than new borrowers, while Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan 
(2011) show that loans to relationship borrowers are 10-17 basis points lower. We test this 
assumption in Table 13, by interacting our variables of main interest with Relationship lending, 
a variable reflecting the existence of a prior lending relationship between the given matched 
bank-firm pair in the previous three-year period.  
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
 Estimates in columns 1-3 refer to the pre-Basel II period and suggest that repeated 
borrowing from the same bank during that period did not result in different loan spreads for 
affected firms (based on the triple interactions with Relationship lending). However, 
relationship ties gain in importance in the post-Basel II period; in the presence of a lending 
relationship, the borrowing firm can recover more than four-fifths of the initial interest cost 
incurred by the downgrade and the resulting change in the firm’s risk weight (coefficient on 
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Relationship lending in column 5).  Not surprisingly, no loan-
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pricing effect exists for upgraded firms (column 6), as the lower credit risk of these firms 
alleviates the need to resort to the same bank for funding. 
 
6.2. Firm-characteristics 
Our next step is to identify certain performance, profitability and capital-structure 
characteristics that enable firms to access the syndicated loan market without being penalized 
for being downgraded. We therefore replace our relationship lending measures with a set of 
firm-level characteristics. Results are presented in Table 14 and suggest that profitable firms 
(as measured by ROA and profitability) can entirely offset higher loan spreads charged by 
banks to downgraded firms; this activity is more prevalent in cases of risk-weight changes (the 
coefficient on the triple interaction term in columns 1-2). Furthermore, banks favourably 
perceive specific corporate actions, such as an increase in the number of employees or in the 
level of cash flows and retained earnings, since these actions mitigate the negative impact of 
firm rating downgrades on AISD (triple interactions with Number of employees, Cash flows, 
and Retained earnings in columns 3-5). However, an increase in firm indebtedness (debt level 
and leverage) produces the exact opposite effect, as suggested by the positive coefficient on 
the interaction of Firm downgrade × Firm RW with Total debt and Leverage (columns 6 and 7 
respectively).10 Therefore, our findings reveal that lenders do not raise spreads (or at least raise 
by less) in response to a firm credit downgrade if the firm was profitable or had less leverage 
before the downgrade.   
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
We investigate the identified firm characteristics that mitigate the negative impacts of 
downgrades further by conducting quartile subsample estimations. We aim to uncover the 
                                                 
10
 When we replicate Table 14 for the pre-Basel II period, most of the double interactions come with a non-
statistically significant coefficient. For brevity, we do not present results from this table (available on request). 
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thresholds for each firm characteristic that allows the mitigating impact. We further replicate 
Table 14 by considering each of the quartiles for our firm-level variables. The investigation 
results are presented in Table 15. We find that the mitigating effect is significant only for firms 
in the top quartile of firm performance, with the exception of Retained earnings, where the 
negative mitigating effect is significant only for firms in the top 25th and 50th percentiles. For 
example, the coefficient for Firm return on assets turns negative and significant only for values 
in the top 25th percentile (the highest ROA group). This corresponds to values above 13.4% 
per annum, indicating that firms above that threshold can fully offset the interest-rate increase 
due to their risk-weight change (see Table 16). 
A similar threshold is calculated for Retained earnings and is located in the second 
quartile, which is the point where retained earnings for firms in our sample turn from negative 
to positive. Hence, firms with negative retained earnings experience an additional increase in 
their borrowing costs. Furthermore, we find that for Asset growth, the mitigating effect of firm 
performance disappears for firms in the lower performance groups. Specifically, firms in the 
bottom quartile experience even greater increases in interest spreads as evidenced by the 
positive and significant coefficient on the triple interaction term. This evidence suggests that 
syndicated lenders punish the worst performers when they come to the syndicated loan market 
with credit rating downgrades in the prior year, while giving previously higher-performing 
firms with downgraded ratings the benefit of the doubt.  
Regarding leverage-related firm characteristics, we find that highly indebted (Total 
debt and Firm leverage) firms in the top quartile of our sample experience further increases in 
loan spread when they are downgraded. The corresponding threshold for Total debt is the third 
quartile, while that for Firm leverage is the fourth quartile, corresponding to values of USD 
6.4 billion and 46.9%, respectively. The increase in bank cost of credit is further magnified for 
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firms with debt level and leverage above these values. On the other hand, borrowing costs for 
less-indebted firms do not increase as much, even when they are downgraded.  
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
6.3. Summing up 
Overall, the results in this section suggest that the effect of ratings-contingent regulation on the 
cost of bank credit is not homogeneous across all borrowers. In fact, this effect largely depends 
on firm performance, since profitable and non-highly leveraged firms with constant cash flows 
can recuperate, and even fully offset, higher loan spreads following a rating-downgrade event. 
Furthermore, prior bank-firm lending relationships act as an additional mitigating factor against 
rising borrowing costs. Thus, for downgraded firms migrating to different regulatory risk-
weighting categories, resorting to familiar banks enables them to recover part of the higher 
spreads charged on their loans. A direct corollary of our empirical analysis is that corporate 
downgrades resulting in risk-weighting changes do not constitute a deterrent for firms aiming 
to obtain syndicated lending. The empirical evidence indicates that strongly performing firms 
with relatively low levels of debt and stable bank relationships can still continue to access the 
syndicated loan market at competitive rates without being subjected to discipline. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether changes in lending behavior in response to corporate credit 
rating events vary under certain conditions. It specifically examines how syndicated loan 
spreads respond to rating changes with or without a corresponding risk-weight change under 
Basel II, and whether different borrower-firm characteristics are significant in determining loan 
conditions. Our results reveal a number of interesting findings that both confirm various a 
priori expectations and provide important new insights into the impact of ratings-contingent 
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banking regulation on the corporate lending practices of banks since the adoption of the Basel 
II Accord. 
Our analysis shows that lending banks respond significantly to corporate downgrades 
by raising loan spreads, increasing required collateral requirements, and reducing loan 
maturities; corporate upgrades do not, in general, elicit a significant response. Our findings 
lend support for the efficacy of Basel II accord in terms of eliciting conservative lending 
decisions by banks in the face of change borrower credit ratings. Furthermore, this response is 
limited to downgrades that specifically increase Basel II risk weights applied on risky assets 
and is mainly concentrated in loans from non-US banks. Furthermore, rating changes carry real 
effects, since corporate downgrades coupled with higher borrowing costs result in worse firm 
performance.  
We additionally reveal the heterogeneous effect of ratings-contingent regulation on 
firms’ cost of credit. This effect is largely dependent on firm performance, as relationship 
borrowers with high profitability and moderate leverage ratios can recuperate, and even fully 
offset, any interest-rate increase following their downgrade. Hence, the migration to a different 
risk-weighting category does not automatically translate into a competitive disadvantage, in 
the form of increased bank financing costs. 
Our research indicates that the adoption of Basel II capital regulation with its refined 
system of asset risk-weighting (depending on the borrowers’ risk profile) had the desired 
impact on lending banks. These findings highlight the difficulties inherent in the regulatory 
authorities’ attempt to calibrate capital requirements to accurately reflect bank portfolio risks. 
They are also relevant for ongoing reforms to improve the global financial architecture. Of 
particular interest is the examination of whether corporate downgrades further alter firm 
borrowing behavior, as well as firms’ choice between alternative financing sources; however, 
we leave that for future research.
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) for 
all variables used in the estimations of the main text. All variables are defined in Table A1.  
 
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 27,396 202.47 162.68 -3.00 1,600.00 
AISU 13,435 28.58 25.18 0.75 450.00 
Firm rating 27,396 0.06 0.95 -7.00 6.00 
Firm downgrade dummy 27,396 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Firm downgrade 24,237 0.25 0.75 0.00 6.00 
Firm upgrade 23,820 0.18 0.60 0.00 7.00 
Firm RW 27,396 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Firm NRW 27,396 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Sovereign rating 27,368 0.03 0.44 -9.00 12.00 
Sov RW 27,374 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Sov NRW 27,374 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Loan amount 27,396 19.42 1.40 12.47 24.62 
Maturity 27,396 49.57 27.72 1.00 1,140.00 
Collateral 27,396 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 27,396 10.25 9.31 1.00 290.00 
Performance provisions 27,396 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
General covenants 27,396 1.01 1.36 0.00 7.00 
Relationship lending 27,396 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Bank return on assets 27,396 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.28 
Bank size 27,396 12.04 1.53 5.89 17.81 
NPLs 27,396 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.31 
Firm return on assets 27,396 0.06 0.08 -0.51 0.31 
Tobin’s Q 27,396 1.53 0.49 0.23 5.00 
Firm leverage 27,396 0.39 0.20 0.00 1.97 
GDP per capita 27,396 -1,614.76 10,538.79 -80,909.59 66,633.97 
GDP growth 27,396 0.26 1.40 -10.92 25.59 
Basel II 26,894 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2. Baseline results with different fixed effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all 
variables are defined in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. 
Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. 
The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers 
(Number of firms) entering each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm rating 7.450*** 6.421*** 6.421*** 6.275*** 
 
[6.381] [5.744] [5.737] [5.542] 
Loan amount -4.913*** -5.584*** -5.584*** -5.881*** 
 
[-5.051] [-5.733] [-5.726] [-6.045] 
Maturity 0.105** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.260*** 
 
[2.456] [4.583] [4.578] [4.626] 
Collateral 31.745*** 27.702*** 27.702*** 27.776*** 
 
[8.620] [8.062] [8.052] [7.979] 
Number of lenders -0.784*** -0.879*** -0.879*** -0.885*** 
 
[-6.381] [-7.566] [-7.557] [-7.605] 
Performance provisions -29.466*** -29.035*** -29.035*** -29.413*** 
 
[-12.566] [-13.531] [-13.516] [-13.547] 
General covenants 2.348** 2.786*** 2.786*** 2.774*** 
 
[2.163] [2.720] [2.717] [2.693] 
Bank return on assets -159.540*** -152.489*** -152.489*** -151.439*** 
 
[-5.431] [-5.590] [-5.584] [-5.510] 
Bank size 0.044 0.036 0.036 0.034 
 
[0.110] [0.095] [0.094] [0.090] 
NPLs 136.327*** 131.039*** 131.039*** 129.490*** 
 
[5.288] [5.353] [5.346] [5.249] 
Firm return on assets -135.856*** -108.337*** -108.337*** -112.613*** 
 
[-5.408] [-4.703] [-4.697] [-4.816] 
Tobin’s Q -49.692*** -34.720*** -34.720*** -35.037*** 
 
[-13.252] [-10.582] [-10.570] [-10.584] 
Firm leverage 188.610*** 173.767*** 173.767*** 172.209*** 
 
[12.117] [12.032] [12.018] [11.794] 
GDP per capita -0.006*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004*** 
 [-4.128] [-2.573] [-2.570] [-2.868] 
GDP growth -2.075** -0.334 -0.334 -0.010 
 [-2.461] [-0.450] [-0.450] [-0.012] 
Constant 294.215*** 287.402*** 287.402*** 294.049*** 
 [14.090] [14.215] [14.198] [14.681] 
Observations 27,396 27,396 27,396 27,317 
Adj. R-squared 0.675 0.714 0.713 0.715 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects N Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects N N Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects N N Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N N Y 
Number of banks 528 528 528 525 
Number of firms 3989 3989 3989 3973 
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Table 3. The asymmetric response of spreads to credit rating changes 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD, and all variables are defined 
in Table A1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table 
denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique 
lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification.  In specification (1), we interact 
Firm rating with Firm downgrade dummy, i.e., a binary variable equal to one if firm is downgraded, otherwise zero. The 
*, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Firm rating 1.948   
 
[1.408]   
Firm rating × Firm downgrade dummy 7.828**   
 [2.253]   
Firm downgrade  8.857***  
  [4.846]  
Firm upgrade   -0.994 
   [-0.747] 
Firm downgrade dummy -0.049   
 [-0.009]   
Loan amount -5.551*** -5.156*** -5.238*** 
 
[-5.694] [-4.934] [-5.300] 
Maturity 0.259*** 0.258*** 0.245*** 
 
[4.587] [4.338] [4.217] 
Collateral 27.617*** 26.577*** 26.343*** 
 
[8.062] [7.111] [7.600] 
Number of lenders -0.880*** -0.939*** -0.731*** 
 
[-7.584] [-7.891] [-6.673] 
Performance provisions -28.954*** -30.121*** -23.763*** 
 
[-13.501] [-13.104] [-11.418] 
General covenants 2.734*** 3.254*** 1.558 
 
[2.671] [2.965] [1.519] 
Bank return on assets -152.356*** -148.911*** -100.807*** 
 
[-5.585] [-5.034] [-3.818] 
Bank size 0.059 -0.010 0.226 
 
[0.156] [-0.024] [0.598] 
NPLs 130.712*** 132.553*** 115.758*** 
 
[5.338] [4.958] [4.776] 
Firm return on assets -104.726*** -96.517*** -129.328*** 
 
[-4.527] [-3.798] [-5.357] 
Tobin’s Q -34.665*** -36.399*** -30.527*** 
 
[-10.616] [-10.057] [-9.272] 
Firm leverage 173.063*** 182.013*** 161.034*** 
 
[11.913] [11.394] [11.057] 
GDP per capita -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 [-2.554] [-2.610] [-3.685] 
GDP growth -0.327 0.327 -0.164 
 [-0.443] [0.381] [-0.220] 
Constant 285.021*** 278.541*** 269.523*** 
 [14.105] [12.942] [13.127] 
Observations 27,396 24,114 23,656 
Adj. R-squared 0.714 0.716 0.730 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y 
Number of banks 528 505 482 
Number of firms 3989 3777 3718 
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Table 4. The response of spreads to risk weight changes and the role of Basel II 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of Firm 
RW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a change in the firm’s risk-weighting category, otherwise zero), 
Firm NRW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a non-change in the firm’s risk-weighting category, otherwise 
zero), and Basel II (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country, 
otherwise zero). The dependent variable is AISD, and all variables are defined in Table A1. The estimation 
method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of 
fixed effects used in each specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders 
(Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In all specifications, we 
exclusively interact Firm rating with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double 
interaction term with Basel II. In specification (1), we include all loans. In specification (2), we exclude loans 
from US lenders. In specification (3), we only include loans from US lenders. In specification (4), we only 
include loans from US lenders to US borrowers. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) 
All loans 
(2) 
Non-US lenders 
(3) 
US lenders 
(4)  
US loans 
Firm rating × Firm RW 5.758*** -0.026 8.178*** 7.196*** 
 
[3.579] [-0.011] [3.771] [3.565] 
Firm rating × Firm NRW 2.383 5.991 3.425 4.434* 
 [1.088] [1.571] [1.411] [1.810] 
Firm rating × Firm RW × Basel II 6.745* 11.597** 1.351 1.973 
 [1.935] [2.200] [0.289] [0.412] 
Firm rating × Firm NRW × Basel II 5.846* -0.169 4.622 2.984 
 [1.723] [-0.034] [1.038] [0.661] 
Basel II -10.194 32.854   
 [-0.998] [1.294]   
Observations 26,257 7,734 18,523 17,382 
Adj. R-squared 0.716 0.754 0.723 0.727 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y N N 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y N 
Number of banks 491 201 290 274 
Number of firms 3843 1652 2932 2652 
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Table 5. The asymmetric response of spreads to risk weight changes and the role of Basel II 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of Firm RW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a change in the firm’s risk-weighting 
category, otherwise zero), Firm NRW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a non-change in the firm’s risk-weighting category, otherwise zero), and Basel II (i.e., a binary variable equal to 
one if Basel II is implemented in the lender’s country, otherwise zero). The estimation is conducted for the full sample of loans and certain subsamples of loans. The dependent variable is 
AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in 
each specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specifications (1)-(4), 
we exclusively interact Firm downgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double interaction term with Basel II. In specifications (5)-(8), we exclusively 
interact Firm upgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double interaction term with Basel II. In specifications (1) and (5), we include all loans. In 
specifications (2) and (6), we exclude loans from US lenders. In specifications (3) and (7), we only include loans from US lenders. In specification (4) and (8), we only include loans from US 
lenders to US borrowers. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All loans Non-US lenders US lenders US loans All loans Non-US lenders US lenders US loans
Firm downgrade × Firm RW 5.785** -4.044 8.338*** 7.092***
[2.348] [-0.680] [2.948] [2.745]
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 4.788 9.826* 5.601 5.715
[1.398] [1.699] [1.574] [1.587]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Basel II 11.055** 20.424** 10.465 10.943
[2.194] [2.464] [1.456] [1.515]
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW × Basel II 8.887 -1.329 11.929 11.715
[1.489] [-0.140] [1.621] [1.563]
Firm upgrade × Firm RW -4.547** -0.359 -7.850** -8.105**
[-2.390] [-0.146] [-2.100] [-2.200]
Firm upgrade × Firm NRW 3.245 -1.11 2.506 -1.511
[0.964] [-0.229] [0.565] [-0.369]
Firm upgrade × Firm RW × Basel II 1.279 3.814 5.408 7.016
[0.286] [0.496] [0.807] [1.011]
Firm upgrade × Firm NRW × Basel II -11.116** -6.251 -8.721 -3.986
[-2.458] [-0.873] [-1.447] [-0.683]
Basel II -16.602 -6.159 -5.485 63.492***
[-1.372] [-0.227] [-0.608] [2.628]
Observations 23,052 6,539 16,513 15,580 22,534 6,688 15,844 14,865
Adj. R-squared 0.72 0.786 0.728 0.732 0.735 0.765 0.744 0.747
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lender’s country effects Y Y N N Y Y N N
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Number of banks 467 185 282 267 445 182 263 245
Number of firms 3640 1490 2792 2550 3580 1507 2711 2471
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Table 6. The response of spreads to sovereign risk weight changes 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of Sov rating (i.e., the 
change in the sovereign’s numerical credit rating), Sov RW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a change in the sovereign’s 
risk-weighting category, otherwise zero), and Sov NRW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a non-change in the sovereign’s 
risk-weighting category, otherwise zero). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed 
effects used in each specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and 
borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specifications (1), (3), and (5), we interact Firm rating, Firm 
downgrade, and Firm upgrade respectively, with Sov rating. In specifications (2), (4), and (6), we exclusively interact Firm 
rating, Firm downgrade, and Firm upgrade respectively, with Sov rating, and further interact each double interaction term 
with Sov RW and Sov NRW respectively. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm rating 6.381*** 6.448***     
 [5.654] [5.765]     
Firm rating × Sov rating 2.459      
 [1.206]      
Firm rating × Sov rating × Sov RW  5.616***     
  [2.992]     
Firm rating × Sov rating × Sov NRW  -1.357     
  [-0.717]     
Firm downgrade   8.375*** 8.472***   
   [4.577] [4.605]   
Firm downgrade × Sov rating   6.137***    
   [2.627]    
Firm downgrade × Sov rating × Sov RW    6.807***   
    [3.267]   
Firm downgrade × Sov rating × Sov NRW    0.720   
 
   [0.132]   
Firm upgrade     -0.837 -0.935 
     [-0.602] [-0.665] 
Firm upgrade × Sov rating     1.860  
     [1.224]  
Firm upgrade × Sov rating × Sov RW      0.538 
      [0.294] 
Firm upgrade × Sov rating × Sov NRW      2.320 
      [1.349] 
Sov rating 0.924 -1.286 -2.841 -2.689 -0.905 -0.978 
 [0.331] [-0.499] [-0.818] [-0.776] [-0.324] [-0.350] 
Observations 27,322 27,322 24,060 24,060 23,605 23,605 
Adj. R-squared 0.713 0.714 0.716 0.716 0.730 0.730 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 525 525 502 502 481 481 
Number of firms 3975 3975 3767 3767 3706 3706 
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Table 7. Asymmetric response of spreads to sovereign risk weight changes and the role of Basel II 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of Sov rating (i.e., the change in the sovereign’s numerical credit rating), Sov 
RW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a change in the sovereign’s risk-weighting category, otherwise zero), and Sov NRW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a non-change 
in the sovereign’s risk-weighting category, otherwise zero). The estimation is conducted for the full sample (all loans) and the subsample of loans from non-US lenders, and for 
different subperiods with the threshold being the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation 
method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The lower part of the table 
denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specifications (1)-(2) and (5)-(6), we interact Firm 
downgrade with Sov rating. In specifications (3)-(4) and (7)-(8), we interact Firm downgrade with Sov rating, and further interact the double interaction term with Sov RW and Sov 
NRW respectively. In specifications (1) and (3), and (2) and (4), we include all loans, and loans from non-US lenders respectively, and conduct the estimation for the period before 
the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country. In specifications (5) and (7), and (6) and (8), we include all loans, and loans from non-US lenders respectively, and conduct 
the estimation for the period after the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Pre-Basel II 
 
 
 
Post-Basel II 
   
 
(1) 
All loans 
(2) 
Non-US lenders 
(3) 
All loans 
(4) 
Non-US lenders  
(5) 
All loans 
(6) 
Non-US lenders 
(7) 
All loans 
(8) 
Non-US lenders 
Firm downgrade 6.837*** -0.152 6.834*** 0.079  7.270** 1.286 7.689** 1.348 
 
[3.095] [-0.027] [3.092] [0.014]  [2.397] [0.247] [2.429] [0.243] 
Firm downgrade × Sov rating 1.881 -3.063    6.646*** 8.014***   
 [0.233] [-0.285]    [2.924] [4.505]   
Firm downgrade × Sov rating × Sov RW   0.763 9.723    7.078*** 8.021*** 
   [0.058] [0.634]    [3.558] [4.610] 
Firm downgrade × Sov rating × Sov NRW   2.239 -8.918    0.794 7.534 
   [0.267] [-0.770]    [0.094] [0.706] 
Sov rating -6.183 3.529 -6.168 3.436  -5.849 -2.353 -5.854 -2.337 
 [-1.096] [0.633] [-1.093] [0.615]  [-1.317] [-0.442] [-1.320] [-0.439] 
Observations 13,453 2,605 13,453 2,605  9,599 3,635 9,599 3,635 
Adj. R-squared 0.715 0.680 0.715 0.680  0.754 0.809 0.754 0.809 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 360 130 360 130  219 101 219 101 
Number of firms 2599 692 2599 692  2100 922 2100 922 
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Table 8. Results for AISU 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISU and all 
variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by 
firm. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part 
of the table. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) 
and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) 
AISU 
(2) 
AISU 
(3) 
AISU 
(4) 
AISU 
Firm rating 0.459** 0.363* 0.363* 0.367* 
 
[2.243] [1.758] [1.756] [1.741] 
AISD 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.130*** 
 [16.902] [12.328] [12.313] [12.036] 
Loan amount -1.006*** -0.615** -0.615** -0.589** 
 
[-3.410] [-2.203] [-2.200] [-2.118] 
Maturity 0.028** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 
 
[2.406] [4.999] [4.993] [5.105] 
Collateral 3.281*** 3.500*** 3.500*** 3.596*** 
 
[4.185] [4.290] [4.285] [4.373] 
Number of lenders -0.015 -0.036 -0.036 -0.048* 
 
[-0.583] [-1.366] [-1.365] [-1.881] 
Performance provisions -0.052 -0.504 -0.504 -0.513 
 
[-0.126] [-1.185] [-1.184] [-1.191] 
General covenants -0.048 -0.119 -0.119 -0.123 
 
[-0.187] [-0.429] [-0.429] [-0.443] 
Bank return on assets 12.941* 12.199 12.199 13.306* 
 
[1.660] [1.597] [1.595] [1.727] 
Bank size 0.071 0.067 0.067 0.086 
 
[1.017] [0.976] [0.975] [1.265] 
NPLs 1.167 1.022 1.022 1.093 
 
[0.242] [0.213] [0.213] [0.228] 
Firm return on assets -0.599 0.457 0.457 0.087 
 
[-0.182] [0.139] [0.139] [0.026] 
Tobin’s Q -1.079** -0.735* -0.735* -0.760* 
 
[-2.302] [-1.653] [-1.651] [-1.689] 
Firm leverage -0.631 0.068 0.068 -0.089 
 
[-0.320] [0.034] [0.034] [-0.043] 
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [-0.811] [-1.023] [-1.022] [-0.396] 
GDP growth 0.223 0.308 0.308 0.348 
 [0.624] [0.849] [0.848] [0.852] 
Constant 26.640*** 18.264*** 18.264*** 17.871*** 
 [4.847] [3.421] [3.417] [3.346] 
Observations 12,624 12,624 12,624 12,585 
Adj. R-squared 0.763 0.768 0.767 0.768 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects N Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects N N Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects N N Y Y 
Country-pair effects N N N Y 
Number of banks 288 288 288 287 
Number of firms 2369 2369 2369 2361 
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Table 9. Asymmetric response of AISU to risk weight changes and the role of Basel II 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of Firm RW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a change in the firm’s risk-weighting 
category, otherwise zero), Firm NRW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a non-change in the firm’s risk-weighting category, otherwise zero), and Basel II (i.e., a binary variable equal to 
one if Basel II is implemented in the lender’s country, otherwise zero). The estimation is conducted for the full sample of loans and certain subsamples of loans. Dependent variable is AISU 
and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each 
specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specifications (1)-(4), we 
exclusively interact Firm downgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double interaction term with Basel II. In specifications (5)-(8), we exclusively 
interact Firm upgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double interaction term with Basel II. In specifications (1) and (5), we include all loans. In 
specifications (2) and (6), we exclude loans from US lenders. In specifications (3) and (7), we only include loans from US lenders. In specification (4) and (8), we only include loans from US 
lenders to US borrowers. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All loans Non-US lenders US lenders US loans All loans Non-US lenders US lenders US loans
Firm downgrade × Firm RW -0.188 0.341 -0.334 -0.395
[-0.457] [0.287] [-0.730] [-0.869]
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 0.307 2.322 0.146 0.184
[0.679] [1.255] [0.322] [0.399]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Basel II 2.618** 2.552 3.008** 2.907**
[2.079] [1.095] [2.051] [1.971]
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW × Basel II 0.332 -0.462 0.293 0.287
[0.385] [-0.181] [0.313] [0.300]
Firm upgrade × Firm RW -0.564 -1.709** -0.148 -0.136
[-1.370] [-2.118] [-0.360] [-0.336]
Firm upgrade × Firm NRW 0.971 2.067* 0.185 0.143
[1.455] [1.810] [0.304] [0.237]
Firm upgrade × Firm RW × Basel II 0.729 1.313 0.414 0.601
[0.921] [0.757] [0.584] [0.843]
Firm upgrade × Firm NRW × Basel II -1.381* -2.251 -0.424 -0.253
[-1.726] [-1.593] [-0.556] [-0.338]
Basel II -1.861 6.101 0.245 3.899
[-0.519] [0.752] [0.096] [0.684]
Observations 10,601 1,727 8,874 8,637 10,232 1,730 8,519 8,276
Adj. R-squared 0.775 0.845 0.755 0.754 0.792 0.87 0.768 0.768
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lender’s country effects Y Y N N Y Y N N
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Number of banks 256 80 176 169 245 79 166 159
Number of firms 2117 518 1825 1747 2063 528 1764 1688
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Table 10. Response of other loan characteristics to credit rating changes 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is 
denoted in the second line of the table and all variables are defined in Table A1. 
Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part 
of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The lower part 
of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers 
(Number of firms) entering each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) 
Loan amount 
(2) 
Maturity 
(3) 
Collateral 
Firm rating 0.013* -0.619*** 0.008** 
 
[1.920] [-3.736] [2.453] 
AISD -0.000*** 0.013*** 0.000*** 
 [-5.830] [6.565] [7.558] 
Loan amount  2.237*** 0.001 
 
 [9.403] [0.303] 
Maturity 0.004***  0.001*** 
 
[4.601]  [5.969] 
Collateral 0.008 7.466***  
 
[0.303] [12.667]  
Number of lenders 0.021*** 0.132*** -0.002*** 
 
[12.906] [4.159] [-3.511] 
Performance provisions 0.086*** 0.382 0.007 
 
[4.794] [0.859] [1.070] 
General covenants -0.013* 0.494*** 0.064*** 
 
[-1.697] [2.714] [16.511] 
Bank return on assets 0.088 -8.838* -0.043 
 
[0.348] [-1.744] [-0.531] 
Bank size 0.009** -0.102 -0.001 
 
[2.452] [-1.307] [-0.493] 
NPLs -0.236 8.279 -0.005 
 
[-1.042] [1.541] [-0.068] 
Firm return on assets 0.145 6.051** -0.108* 
 
[1.089] [1.977] [-1.800] 
Tobin’s Q 0.048* 0.433 -0.013 
 
[1.927] [0.818] [-1.251] 
Firm leverage -0.109 -1.632 0.132*** 
 
[-1.644] [-0.722] [3.781] 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.852] [0.836] [-0.158] 
GDP growth 0.009 -0.301 0.001 
 [1.094] [-1.160] [0.182] 
Constant 18.985*** -0.554 0.232*** 
 [257.127] [-0.109] [3.860] 
Observations 27,396 27,396 27,396 
Adj. R-squared 0.680 0.488 0.706 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y 
Number of banks 528 528 528 
Number of firms 3989 3989 3989 
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Table 11. Real effects for downgraded firms 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion Firm RW downgrade (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a downgrade in the firm’s 
risk-weighting category, otherwise zero), and High borrowing rate (i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrowing rate in the borrower’s country is within the 75th percentile of the 
borrowing rate in our sample, otherwise zero). The estimation is conducted for different subperiods with the threshold being the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country. For the pre-
Basel II period, High borrowing rate is calculated based on the mean of the borrowing rate in the respective period only, while for the post-Basel II period High borrowing rate is calculated 
based on the mean of the borrowing rate in that period only. The dependent variable is denoted in the second line of the table and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is 
OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. In specifications (1)-(5), we conduct the estimation for the 
period before the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country. In specifications (6)-(10), we conduct the estimation for the period after the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s 
country. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Pre-Basel II 
 
 
 
Post-Basel II 
   
 
(1) 
Cash 
flow  
(2) 
Cash  
holdings 
(3) 
Return 
on assets 
(4) 
Total  
assets 
(5) 
Employee 
growth   
(6) 
Cash 
flow 
(7) 
Cash  
holdings 
(8) 
Return on 
assets 
(9) 
Total  
assets 
(10) 
Employee 
growth 
Firm RW downgrade -0.212 -0.003*** -0.003 0.018 -0.027***  -5.194*** -0.007*** -0.023*** -0.035** 0.015 
 [-0.369] [-2.879] [-1.136] [1.191] [-8.201]  [-3.468] [-4.081] [-7.104] [-2.423] [0.853] 
High borrowing rate 
-0.552 -0.000 0.003*** 0.021 -0.017**  16.165*** 0.005*** 0.002 -0.003 0.015 
 [-0.549] [-0.160] [3.030] [1.111] [-2.673]  [6.982] [10.265] [1.341] [-0.199] [1.164] 
Observations 5,893 5,975 4,969 5,280 5,576  3,873 3,876 2,380 2,920 3,661 
Adj. R-squared 0.928 0.803 0.625 0.946 0.337  0.812 0.863 0.695 0.970 0.370 
Firm and macro controls Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 12. Real effects for downgraded firms. Differential effect of high borrowing costs 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion Firm RW downgrade (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a downgrade in the firm’s 
risk-weighting category, otherwise zero), and High borrowing rate (i.e., a binary variable equal to one if the borrowing rate in the borrower’s country is within the 75th percentile of the 
borrowing rate in our sample, otherwise zero). The estimation is conducted for different subperiods with the threshold being the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country. For the pre-
Basel II period, High borrowing rate is calculated based on the mean of the borrowing rate in the respective period only, while for the post-Basel II period High borrowing rate is calculated 
based on the mean of the borrowing rate in that period only. The dependent variable is denoted in the second line of the table and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is 
OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. In specifications (1)-(5), we conduct the estimation for the 
period before the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country. In specifications (6)-(10), we conduct the estimation for the period after the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s 
country. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Pre-Basel II 
 
 
 
Post-Basel II 
   
 
(1) 
Cash 
flow  
(2) 
Cash  
holdings 
(3) 
Return 
on assets 
(4) 
Total  
assets 
(5) 
Employee 
growth   
(6) 
Cash 
flow 
(7) 
Cash  
holdings 
(8) 
Return on 
assets 
(9) 
Total  
assets 
(10) 
Employee 
growth 
Firm RW downgrade -2.402 -0.005 -0.001 0.136*** -0.028 
 
6.919 0.008 0.010 0.370*** 0.126*** 
 [-1.034] [-1.511] [-0.138] [5.260] [-1.597] 
 
[1.461] [1.315] [0.675] [4.758] [3.069] 
High borrowing rate -0.617 -0.000 0.001 0.040** -0.021*** 
 
16.746*** 0.005*** 0.004** -0.003 0.017 
 [-0.612] [-0.214] [0.579] [2.482] [-3.272] 
 
[8.772] [15.651] [2.808] [-0.190] [1.607] 
Firm RW downgrade × High borrowing rate 2.811 0.002 -0.001 -0.179*** 0.001 
 
-14.510*** -0.021*** -0.027* -0.401*** -0.126*** 
 [1.246] [0.666] [-0.072] [-7.363] [0.056] 
 
[-3.644] [-3.392] [-1.982] [-5.449] [-3.159] 
Observations 5,898 5,978 5,012 5,292 5,581 
 
3,837 3,841 2,375 2,931 3,618 
Adj. R-squared 0.916 0.805 0.573 0.948 0.342 
 
0.812 0.860 0.696 0.961 0.379 
Firm and macro controls Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table 13. Lending relationships 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of Relationship lending (i.e., a 
binary variable equal to 1 for a prior lending relationship between the lender and the borrower during the previous 3-year period, 
otherwise zero). The estimation is conducted for different subperiods with the threshold being the implementation of Basel II in the 
lender’s country. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors 
clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The lower part of the 
table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In 
specifications (1) and (4), we exclusively interact Firm rating with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each 
double interaction term with Relationship lending. In specifications (2) and (5), we exclusively interact Firm downgrade with Firm 
RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double interaction term with Relationship lending. In specifications (3) and 
(6), we exclusively interact Firm upgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double interaction term 
with Relationship lending. In specifications (1)-(3) we conduct the estimation for the period before the implementation of Basel II in 
the lender’s country, and in the specifications (4)-(6) for the period after. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Pre-Basel II 
 
  
Post-Basel II 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Firm rating × Firm RW 8.718***    10.765***   
 [4.400]    [2.643]   
Firm rating × Firm NRW 6.669***    5.920**   
 [3.117]    [2.298]   
Firm rating × Firm RW × Relationship lending -4.883    -9.690*   
 [-1.613]    [-1.850]   
Firm downgrade × Firm RW  8.451***    15.981***  
  [3.118]    [2.669]  
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW  7.697**    7.391*  
  [2.300]    [1.920]  
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Relationship lending  -5.901    -13.796*  
  [-1.342]    [-1.818]  
Firm upgrade × Firm RW   -4.679**    -3.641 
   [-1.988]    [-0.826] 
Firm upgrade × Firm NRW   -0.257    -4.392* 
 
  [-0.086]    [-1.697] 
Firm upgrade × Firm RW × Relationship lending   -0.422    5.295 
   [-0.144]    [0.793] 
Observations 15,157 13,483 12,653  11,204 9,624 9,993 
Adj. R-squared 0.712 0.715 0.731  0.749 0.754 0.760 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Full set of controls Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Number of banks 380 364 334  235 219 219 
Number of firms 2779 2606 2547  2262 2106 2115 
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Table 14. Firm heterogeneities. Post-Basel II 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of a number of firm-level characteristics. The estimation is conducted for the period 
after the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered 
by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) 
and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specification (1), we double-interact Firm downgrade and Firm RW with Firm return on assets. In specification (2), we 
double-interact Firm downgrade and Firm RW with Profitability. In specification (3), we double-interact Firm downgrade and Firm RW with Number of employees. In specification (4), we 
double-interact Firm downgrade and Firm RW with Cash flows. In specification (5), we double-interact Firm downgrade and Firm RW with Retained earnings. In specification (6), we 
double-interact Firm downgrade and Firm RW with Total debt. In specification (7), we double-interact Firm downgrade and Firm RW with Leverage. The *, **, and *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Firm downgrade × Firm RW 12.437*** 23.471*** 19.295*** 16.612*** 16.010*** 13.403** -31.044***
[2.734] [3.267] [3.382] [3.367] [3.166] [2.467] [-3.020]
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 8.843** 16.860*** 10.831*** 10.352*** 11.635*** 15.749*** 12.744***
[2.270] [4.164] [2.797] [2.612] [3.022] [3.865] [3.380]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Firm return on assets -80.058**
[-2.207]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Profitability -112.172**
[-2.342]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Number of employees -0.058**
[-2.182]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Cash flows -0.001*
[-1.761]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Retained earnings -0.000**
[-2.067]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Total debt 6.867***
[2.585]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Leverage 113.192***
[3.970]
Observations 9,624 6,476 7,800 7,702 7,999 6,758 9,624
Adj. R-squared 0.754 0.745 0.752 0.746 0.753 0.745 0.735
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of banks 219 168 192 192 202 171 219
Number of firms 2106 1389 1745 1730 1755 1450 2106
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Table 15. Firm heterogeneities: Different percentiles. Post-Basel II 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of binary variables for a number of firm-level characteristics if these characteristics are 
within each of the four 25th percentiles in our sample. The estimation is conducted for the period after the implementation of Basel II in the lender’s country. Dependent variable is AISD and 
all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. Column (1), presents the coefficients on the double interaction of Firm downgrade 
with Firm RW and Firm NRW along with the coefficient on the triple interaction of Firm downgrade with Firm RW and each of the firm-level characteristics for the full sample. Column (2), 
presents the coefficients on the double interaction of Firm downgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW along with the coefficient on the triple interaction of Firm downgrade with Firm RW and 
a binary variable equal to one if each of the firm-level characteristics is within the 1st 25th percentile in our sample, otherwise zero. Column (3), presents the coefficients on the double 
interaction of Firm downgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW along with the coefficient on the triple interaction of Firm downgrade with Firm RW and a binary variable equal to one if each 
of the firm-level characteristics is within the 2nd 25th percentile in our sample, otherwise zero. Column (4), presents the coefficients on the double interaction of Firm downgrade with Firm 
RW and Firm NRW along with the coefficient on the triple interaction of Firm downgrade with Firm RW and a binary variable equal to one if each of the firm-level characteristics is within 
the 3rd 25th percentile in our sample, otherwise zero. Column (4), presents the coefficients on the double interaction of Firm downgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW along with the coefficient 
on the triple interaction of Firm downgrade with Firm RW and a binary variable equal to one if each of the firm-level characteristics is within the 4th 25th percentile in our sample, otherwise 
zero. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample 1st 25th percentile 2nd 25th percentile 3rd 25th percentile 4th 25th percentile
Firm downgrade × Firm RW 12.437*** 11.823** 11.145** 11.893** 14.941***
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 8.843** 10.712** 10.640** 10.656** 8.716**
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Firm return on assets -80.058** 1.087 5.871 7.731 -106.771**
Firm downgrade × Firm RW 16.727** 11.582** 11.752** 8.141* 18.561***
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 12.455*** 7.282* 7.240* 7.131* 12.875***
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Cash holdings 22.245 -8.281 -6.748 19.263 -17.907**
Firm downgrade × Firm RW 16.010*** 4.967 11.257** 14.689*** 13.642**
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 11.635*** 7.391* 7.299* 7.171* 7.307*
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Retained earnings -0.000** 20.824** -2.468 -24.361** -6.744
Firm downgrade × Firm RW
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 10.845*** 7.078* 7.365* 7.248* 7.263*
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Asset growth -26.333 20.519** 15.279 -8.552 -33.655***
Firm downgrade × Firm RW 17.322*** 5.19 7.975 10.099** 18.891***
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 9.667** 7.232* 7.297* 7.302* 7.262*
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × PPE growth -17.749 12.286 13.239 9.192 -33.117***
Firm downgrade × Firm RW 13.403** 12.103** 13.783*** 11.495** 1.36
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 15.749*** 7.278* 6.972* 7.305* 7.189*
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Total debt 6.867*** -14.708 -22.550* -2.655 17.643**
Firm downgrade × Firm RW -31.044*** 16.381*** 15.533*** 17.790*** 1.062
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 12.744*** 12.520*** 12.374*** 12.329*** 12.591***
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Leverage 113.192*** -16.656** -17.25 -14.841* 46.025***
18.058***17.744*** 0.414 9.005* 12.185**
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Table 16. Firm heterogeneities: Different percentiles. Post-Basel II 
The table reports values across the three 25th percentiles for the firm-level characteristics 
employed in the estimations of Table 15. 
 
(1) 
25% percentile 
(2) 
50% percentile 
(3) 
75% percentile 
Firm return on assets 0.017 0.056 0.133 
    
Cash holdings 0.015 0.042 0.093 
    
Retained earnings (millions) -67.585 538.000 3,253.500 
    
Asset growth -0.027 0.040 0.120 
    
PPE growth -0.039 0.030 0.111 
    
Total debt (millions) 561.121 1660.334 6429.116 
 
   
Leverage 0.274 0.366 0.469 
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Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Description Source 
   
A. Dependent variables in main specifications 
AISD All-in-spread-drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LIBOR plus any facility 
fee. 
DealScan 
AISU  All-in-spread-undrawn, defined as the sum of the facility fee and the commitment 
fee. 
DealScan 
 
B. Main explanatory variables: Firm credit ratings 
Firm rating The change in the borrower’s numerical credit rating in the year before the loan 
facility’s origination year. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Firm downgrade dummy A binary variable equal to one, if the borrower’s credit rating is downgraded in the 
year before the loan facility’s origination year, otherwise zero. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Firm downgrade The positive changes (i.e., a deterioration in the borrower’s credit rating) and non-
changes (i.e., the borrower retains the same credit rating) in the borrower’s 
numerical credit rating in the year before the loan facility’s origination year. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Firm upgrade The negative changes (i.e., an improvement in the borrower’s credit rating) and 
non-changes (i.e., the borrower retains the same credit rating) in the borrower’s 
numerical credit rating in the year before the loan facility’s origination year. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Firm RW A binary variable equal to one, if the borrower’s credit rating change leads to a 
change in the borrower’s risk-weighting category in the year before the loan 
facility’s origination year, otherwise zero. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Firm NRW A binary variable equal to one, if the borrower’s credit rating change leads to a 
non-change in the borrower’s risk-weighting category in the year before the loan 
facility’s origination year, otherwise zero. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Firm RW downgrade A binary variable equal to one, if the borrower’s credit rating change leads to a 
downgrade in the borrower’s risk-weighting category in the year before the loan 
facility’s origination year, otherwise zero. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
 
C. Main explanatory variables: Firm credit ratings 
Sov rating The change in the borrower’s country numerical credit rating in the year before the 
loan facility’s origination year. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Sov RW A binary variable equal to one, if the borrower’s country credit rating change leads 
to a change in the borrower’s country risk-weighting category in the year before 
the loan facility’s origination year, otherwise zero. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
Sov NRW A binary variable equal to one, if the borrower’s country credit rating change leads 
to a non-change in the borrower’s country risk-weighting category in the year 
before the loan facility’s origination year, otherwise zero. 
S&P 
Credit Ratings 
   
D. Explanatory variables: Loan characteristics 
Loan amount Log of the loan facility amount in USD. DealScan 
Maturity  Loan duration in months. DealScan 
Collateral A binary variable equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral, zero otherwise. DealScan 
Number of lenders The number of banks involved in the syndicated loan. DealScan 
Performance provisions A binary variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
General covenants The total number of covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Loan purpose A series of binary variables indicating loan purpose (e.g., corporate purpose, debt 
repay, etc.) and whether the loan facility is a term loan or a revolver.  
DealScan 
Relationship lending A binary variable equal to one for a prior loan facility between the lender and the 
borrower in the 3-year period before the loan facility’s origination year, zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
 
   
E. Explanatory variables: Lender characteristics  
Bank return on assets The return on total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank size The log of total bank assets. Compustat 
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NPLs The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Compustat 
 
F. Explanatory variables: Borrower characteristics 
Firm return on assets The return on total firm assets. Compustat 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Compustat 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets. Compustat 
Profitability The inverse return on total firm assets. Compustat 
Number of employees The number of firm employees. Compustat 
Cash flows The income before extraordinary items in million USD. Compustat 
Retained earnings The retained earnings in million USD. Compustat 
Total debt The total debt in million USD. Compustat 
   
G. Explanatory variables:  Differences between the lender and borrower countries 
GDP per capita The difference in annual GDP per capita in constant prices between the lender’s 
and the borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
GDP growth The difference in annual GDP growth rate (%) between the lender’s and the 
borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
 
   
H. Explanatory variables: Lender’s country 
Basel II  A binary variable equal to one if the lending rate in the borrower’s country is 
within the 75th percentile of the lending rate in our sample, otherwise zero 
Own 
estimations 
 
I. Explanatory variables: Borrower’s country 
High borrowing rate A binary variable equal to one if the borrowing rate in the borrower’s country is 
within the 75th percentile of the borrowing rate in our sample, otherwise zero. 
DealScan 
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Table A2. Numerical conversions of firm credit ratings  
The table presents the conversions of firm credit ratings to numerical credit 
ratings and numerical risk-weighting categories. 
Rating Numerical rating Risk-weighting category 
AAA 1 1 
AA+ 2 1 
AA 3 1 
AA- 4 1 
A+ 5 2 
A 6 2 
A- 7 2 
BBB+ 8 3 
BBB 9 3 
BBB- 10 3 
BB+ 11 3 
BB 12 3 
BB- 13 3 
B+ 14 4 
B 15 4 
B- 16 4 
CCC+ 17 4 
CCC 18 4 
CCC- 19 4 
CC 20 4 
C 21 4 
D/SD 22 4 
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Table A3. Baseline results with different controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Different specifications include different loan-, firm-, bank-, and 
macro- controls. Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard 
errors clustered by firm. Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the penultimate part of the table. 
The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering 
each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm rating 6.952*** 6.852*** 6.503*** 6.577*** 7.781*** 6.934*** 
 
[5.986] [5.998] [5.724] [5.296] [6.785] [5.714] 
Loan amount  -7.826***  -6.139*** -3.686*** -3.587*** 
 
 [-7.966]  [-5.691] [-3.411] [-3.349] 
Maturity  0.239***  0.331*** 0.256*** 0.221*** 
 
 [4.573]  [6.032] [4.483] [4.040] 
Collateral  27.053***  27.905*** 24.350*** 24.579*** 
 
 [7.751]  [7.454] [6.780] [6.644] 
Number of lenders   -1.006*** -0.945*** -0.830*** -0.811*** 
 
  [-8.505] [-7.399] [-6.345] [-6.189] 
Performance provisions   -29.539*** -31.877*** -30.681*** -30.276*** 
 
  [-13.525] [-13.889] [-13.608] [-12.623] 
General covenants   4.980*** 3.030*** 3.110*** 3.736*** 
 
  [4.816] [2.735] [2.938] [3.268] 
Bank return on assets -164.557*** -158.566*** -159.049*** -134.949*** -117.038*** -117.793*** 
 
[-5.929] [-5.766] [-5.786] [-4.459] [-4.176] [-4.002] 
Bank size -0.057 0.041 -0.048 0.331 0.128 0.251 
 
[-0.148] [0.109] [-0.126] [0.777] [0.305] [0.601] 
NPLs 138.918*** 133.300*** 136.150***    
 
[5.556] [5.378] [5.513]    
Firm return on assets -113.792*** -108.178*** -112.080*** -105.945*** -226.972*** -228.459*** 
 [-4.733] [-4.566] [-4.800] [-4.345] [-10.278] [-9.416] 
Tobin’s Q -36.956*** -35.679*** -35.731*** -32.409*** -33.043*** -34.682*** 
 [-10.713] [-10.818] [-10.429] [-9.368] [-9.967] [-10.145] 
Firm leverage 185.573*** 178.293*** 180.291*** 175.686***   
 [12.404] [12.055] [12.335] [11.411]   
GDP per capita -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.002  
 [-2.688] [-2.622] [-2.649] [-2.557] [-0.770]  
GDP growth -0.748 -0.603 -0.423 0.032 -1.246  
 [-0.994] [-0.810] [-0.566] [0.032] [-0.710]  
Bank capital    82.627*** 64.295** 80.301** 
    [2.613] [2.154] [2.573] 
Firm size     -44.836*** -54.092*** 
     [-5.884] [-9.171] 
Trade balance      -0.001** 
      [-2.169] 
Inflation      -9.964*** 
      [-3.855] 
VIX      1.058*** 
      [6.097] 
Constant 188.072*** 315.889*** 203.166*** 284.773*** 696.533*** 746.290*** 
 [22.025] [15.384] [23.630] [12.841] [11.560] [15.091] 
Observations 27,421 27,396 27,421 22,553 22,552 19,545 
Adj. R-squared 0.703 0.708 0.710 0.712 0.742 0.756 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 531 528 531 463 462 398 
Number of firms 3993 3989 3993 3625 3625 3226 
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Table A4. Response of spreads to risk weight changes 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is 
the inclusion of Firm RW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a change in the firm’s 
risk-weighting category, otherwise zero) and Firm NRW (i.e., a binary variable equal to 
one for a non-change in the firm’s risk-weighting category, otherwise zero). Dependent 
variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS 
with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type 
of fixed effects used in each specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number 
of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each 
specification. In specification (1), we exclusively interact Firm rating with Firm RW and 
Firm NRW respectively. In specification (2), we exclusively interact Firm downgrade 
with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively. In specification (3), we exclusively interact 
Firm upgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively. The *, **, and *** marks 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Firm rating × Firm RW 7.774***   
 
[5.264]   
Firm rating × Firm NRW 5.299***   
 [3.286]   
Firm downgrade × Firm RW  9.324***  
  [4.191]  
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW  8.372***  
  [3.105]  
Firm upgrade × Firm RW   -3.228** 
   [-2.201] 
Firm upgrade × Firm NRW   0.360 
   [0.201] 
Observations 27,396 24,114 23,656 
Adj. R-squared 0.713 0.716 0.730 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y 
Number of banks 528 505 482 
Number of firms 3989 3777 3718 
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Table A5. Asymmetric response of collateral to risk weight changes and the role of Basel II 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of Firm RW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a change in the firm’s risk-weighting 
category, otherwise zero), Firm NRW (i.e., a binary variable equal to one for a non-change in the firm’s risk-weighting category, otherwise zero), and Basel II (i.e., a binary variable equal to 
one if Basel II is implemented in the lender’s country, otherwise zero). The estimation is conducted for the full sample of loans and certain subsamples of loans. Dependent variable is Collateral 
and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each 
specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification.  In specifications (1)-(4), we 
exclusively interact Firm downgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double interaction term with Basel II. In specifications (5)-(8), we exclusively 
interact Firm upgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double interaction term with Basel II. In specifications (1) and (5), we include all loans. In 
specifications (2) and (6), we exclude loans from US lenders. In specifications (3) and (7), we only include loans from US lenders. In specification (4) and (8), we only include loans from US 
lenders to US borrowers. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All loans Non-US lenders US lenders US loans All loans Non-US lenders US lenders US loans
Firm downgrade × Firm RW -0.001 -0.026 0.006 0.01
[-0.063] [-1.584] [0.700] [1.097]
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006
[0.732] [0.108] [0.597] [0.753]
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Basel II 0.019 0.042** 0.013 0.005
[1.491] [1.998] [0.728] [0.255]
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW × Basel II 0.019 0.028 0.019 0.019
[1.498] [0.711] [1.328] [1.303]
Firm upgrade × Firm RW -0.022** -0.012 -0.025 -0.024
[-1.990] [-1.308] [-1.599] [-1.495]
Firm upgrade × Firm NRW -0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.008
[-0.159] [-0.531] [-0.168] [-0.609]
Firm upgrade × Firm RW × Basel II 0.005 -0.017 0.012 0.012
[0.235] [-0.564] [0.534] [0.530]
Firm upgrade × Firm NRW × Basel II -0.008 -0.023 0.016 0.024
[-0.460] [-1.052] [0.770] [1.183]
Basel II -0.002 0.138* -0.007 0.096
[-0.049] [1.650] [-0.193] [1.211]
Observations 23,052 6,539 16,513 15,580 22,534 6,707 15,879 14,900
Adj. R-squared 0.716 0.798 0.708 0.707 0.714 0.792 0.706 0.706
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lender’s country effects Y Y N N Y Y N N
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Number of banks 467 185 282 267 445 182 263 245
Number of firms 3640 1490 2792 2550 3580 1512 2713 2473
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Table A6. Heckman sample-selection model 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from Heckman’s (1979) sample-selection model. The dependent 
variable is in the second line of each panel and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method in Panel A is maximum 
likelihood and in Panel B is OLS with standard errors clustered by bank. Panel A reports the estimates from the first-stage probit 
model to estimate the determinants of the firm’s loan-taking decision. The lower part panel A denotes the dummy variables used 
in each specification. Panel B reports the estimates from the second-stage OLS regression for the effect of firm credit rating 
changes on loan spreads. Each of the specification in Panel B includes the inverse mills ratio (Lambda) from the corresponding 
specification in Panel A. The penultimate part of Panel B denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The lower 
part of Panel B denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each 
specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: The loan-taking decision by the firm 
 
(1) 
Loan deal 
(2) 
Loan deal 
(3) 
Loan deal 
Firm return on assets -0.567*** -0.567*** -0.567*** 
 
[-5.389] [-5.389] [-5.389] 
Tobins’ Q -0.044** -0.044** -0.044** 
 
[-2.454] [-2.454] [-2.454] 
Firm leverage 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.296*** 
 
[6.882] [6.882] [6.882] 
Firm size -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 
[-3.909] [-3.909] [-3.909] 
Firm rating category -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.187*** 
 [-15.242] [-15.242] [-15.242] 
Loan amount 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 
[0.905] [0.905] [0.905] 
Maturity -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
[-8.345] [-8.345] [-8.345] 
Collateral 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 
[3.330] [3.330] [3.330] 
Number of lenders 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
[1.195] [1.195] [1.195] 
Performance provisions 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
 
[7.017] [7.017] [7.017] 
General covenants 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 
[7.744] [7.744] [7.744] 
Term loan -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.078*** 
 [-4.157] [-4.157] [-4.157] 
Bank return on assets 0.322 0.322 0.322 
 
[0.865] [0.865] [0.865] 
Bank size -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
[-0.495] [-0.495] [-0.495] 
NPLs 0.110 0.110 0.110 
 
[0.316] [0.316] [0.316] 
Bank loans 5.840*** 5.840*** 5.840*** 
 
[15.851] [15.851] [15.851] 
Firm loans 83.195** 83.195** 83.195** 
 
[2.264] [2.264] [2.264] 
Bank-firm loans -164.585*** -164.585*** -164.585*** 
 
[-2.824] [-2.824] [-2.824] 
Constant -303.439*** -303.439*** -303.439*** 
 [-79.371] [-79.371] [-79.371] 
Observations 37,268 37,268 37,268 
Loan purpose dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Bank dummies Y Y Y 
Firm dummies Y Y Y 
Lender’s country dummies Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country dummies Y Y Y 
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Panel B: The effect of credit rating changes on loan spreads 
 
 
(1) 
AISD 
(2) 
AISD 
(3) 
AISD 
Firm rating 2.001   
 
[1.464]   
Firm rating × Firm downgrade dummy 7.305**   
 
[2.142]   
Firm downgrade  8.781***  
 
 [4.963]  
Firm upgrade   -0.899 
 
  [-0.681] 
Firm downgrade dummy 0.484   
 
[0.091]   
Loan amount -5.107*** -4.794*** -5.025*** 
 
[-5.468] [-4.801] [-5.247] 
Maturity 0.197*** 0.220*** 0.191*** 
 
[3.409] [3.626] [3.206] 
Collateral 28.041*** 26.498*** 26.699*** 
 
[8.222] [7.126] [7.786] 
Number of lenders -0.851*** -0.925*** -0.706*** 
 
[-7.353] [-7.805] [-6.508] 
Performance provisions -26.468*** -28.614*** -21.506*** 
 
[-11.919] [-11.983] [-9.842] 
General covenants 3.943*** 3.976*** 2.447** 
 [3.807] [3.550] [2.324] 
Bank return on assets -137.961*** -137.071*** -90.871*** 
 [-5.135] [-4.707] [-3.469] 
Bank size -0.164 -0.218 0.077 
 [-0.444] [-0.544] [0.205] 
NPLs 131.914*** 130.629*** 117.724*** 
 [5.424] [4.955] [4.907] 
Firm return on assets -120.527*** -110.872*** -140.637*** 
 [-5.359] [-4.492] [-5.873] 
Tobin’s Q -33.770*** -35.064*** -30.114*** 
 [-10.589] [-10.001] [-9.311] 
Firm leverage 166.974*** 172.247*** 159.034*** 
 [12.296] [11.595] [11.706] 
GDP per capita -0.003** -0.003** -0.004*** 
 [-2.562] [-2.561] [-3.644] 
GDP growth -0.322 0.317 -0.218 
 [-0.443] [0.373] [-0.295] 
Lambda 51.634*** 29.683* 45.390*** 
 [3.677] [1.924] [3.092] 
Constant 264.639*** 267.367*** 254.325*** 
 [13.254] [12.612] [12.550] 
Observations 27,386 24,104 23,649 
Adj. R-squared 0.718 0.720 0.733 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y 
Number of banks 527 504 481 
Number of firms 3989 3777 3717 
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Table A7. Monetary policy stance 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the 
inclusion of Shadow rate (i.e., the quarterly shadow short rate in the lender’s country). Dependent 
variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with 
standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects 
used in each specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders 
(Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specification 
(1), we exclusively interact Firm rating with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further 
interact each double interaction term with Relationship lending. In specification (2), we 
exclusively interact Firm downgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further 
interact each double interaction term with Shadow rate. In specification (3), we exclusively 
interact Firm upgrade with Firm RW and Firm NRW respectively, and further interact each double 
interaction term with Shadow rate. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Firm rating × Firm RW 9.818***   
 
[4.983]   
Firm rating × Firm NRW 5.615***   
 
[3.238]   
Firm rating × Firm RW × Shadow rate -0.967*   
 [-1.873]   
Firm downgrade × Firm RW  13.463***  
  [4.753]  
Firm downgrade × Firm RW  8.770***  
  [3.109]  
Firm downgrade × Firm RW × Shadow rate  -1.540**  
  [-2.196]  
Firm upgrade × Firm RW   -1.727 
   [-0.740] 
Firm upgrade × Firm RW   0.305 
   [0.148] 
Firm upgrade × Firm RW × Shadow rate   -1.027* 
   [-1.751] 
Observations 23,511 20,705 20,229 
Adj. R-squared 0.721 0.725 0.739 
Full interactions and main terms Y Y Y 
Full set of controls Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y 
Number of banks 445 424 403 
Number of firms 3567 3376 3319 
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Table A8. Different clustering of standard errors 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined 
in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in 
each specification and the last line of the part denotes the type of standard error clustering (B&F&Y refers to Bank 
and Firm and Year). The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders (Number of banks) and 
borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm rating 6.421*** 6.421*** 6.421*** 6.421*** 6.421*** 
 
[7.005] [5.229] [5.166] [5.166] [5.376] 
Loan amount -5.584*** -5.584*** -5.584*** -5.584*** -5.584*** 
 
[-6.922] [-4.431] [-4.348] [-4.348] [-3.917] 
Maturity 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 
 
[5.350] [4.188] [4.103] [4.103] [5.018] 
Collateral 27.702*** 27.702*** 27.702*** 27.702*** 27.702*** 
 
[10.059] [6.768] [6.630] [6.630] [6.027] 
Number of lenders -0.879*** -0.879*** -0.879*** -0.879*** -0.879*** 
 
[-9.825] [-7.606] [-7.193] [-7.193] [-5.505] 
Performance provisions -29.035*** -29.035*** -29.035*** -29.035*** -29.035*** 
 
[-17.793] [-11.157] [-10.769] [-10.769] [-7.690] 
General covenants 2.786*** 2.786*** 2.786*** 2.786*** 2.786* 
 
[3.443] [2.972] [2.704] [2.704] [1.792] 
Bank return on assets -152.489*** -152.489*** -152.489*** -152.489*** -152.489*** 
 
[-5.639] [-4.907] [-5.069] [-5.069] [-4.304] 
Bank size 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 
 
[0.092] [0.103] [0.105] [0.105] [0.101] 
NPLs 131.039*** 131.039*** 131.039*** 131.039*** 131.039*** 
 
[5.315] [3.841] [4.018] [4.018] [4.406] 
Firm return on assets -108.337*** -108.337*** -108.337*** -108.337*** -108.337*** 
 
[-6.056] [-6.118] [-5.359] [-5.359] [-4.375] 
Tobin’s Q -34.720*** -34.720*** -34.720*** -34.720*** -34.720*** 
 
[-15.111] [-7.185] [-7.120] [-7.120] [-8.055] 
Firm leverage 173.767*** 173.767*** 173.767*** 173.767*** 173.767*** 
 
[17.046] [11.080] [10.230] [10.230] [7.646] 
GDP per capita -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003* -0.003* -0.003** 
 [-3.269] [-2.038] [-1.964] [-1.964] [-2.106] 
GDP growth -0.334 -0.334 -0.334 -0.334 -0.334 
 [-0.513] [-0.436] [-0.447] [-0.447] [-0.411] 
Constant 287.402*** 287.402*** 287.402*** 287.402*** 287.402*** 
 [17.343] [10.553] [10.424] [10.424] [9.148] 
Observations 27,396 27,396 27,396 27,396 27,396 
Adj. R-squared 0.715 0.714 0.713 0.713 0.713 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustering Loan Bank Bank & Firm Firm & Year B&F&Y 
Number of banks 528 528 528 528 528 
Number of firms 3989 3989 3989 3989 3989 
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Table A9. Weighted least squares 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD and all 
variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is weighted least squares with standard 
errors clustered by borrower. The penultimate part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects 
used in each specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of unique lenders 
(Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specification 
(1), we weight by the number of loans of the lender to the total number of loans in that year. In 
specification (2), we weight by the number of loans to the borrower in a year to the total number 
of loans in that year. In specification (3), we weight by the number of loans between a lender and 
the borrower’s country in a given year to the total number of loans extended in that year. In 
specification (4), we weight by the number of loans between the lender’s country and the 
borrower’s country in a given year to the total number of loans extended in that year. The *, **, 
and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm rating 5.885*** 7.000*** 6.827*** 6.782*** 
 
[4.052] [5.304] [4.156] [4.888] 
Loan amount -6.522*** -8.496*** -7.594*** -9.130*** 
 
[-6.281] [-7.171] [-6.398] [-7.023] 
Maturity 0.249*** 0.262*** 0.243*** 0.225*** 
 
[4.870] [5.189] [5.613] [4.197] 
Collateral 33.124*** 31.525*** 35.361*** 32.952*** 
 
[7.633] [8.796] [7.726] [8.900] 
Number of lenders -0.640*** -0.810*** -0.587*** -0.746*** 
 
[-5.821] [-6.628] [-5.016] [-6.024] 
Performance provisions -25.684*** -34.075*** -28.712*** -35.530*** 
 
[-10.353] [-13.804] [-10.472] [-13.760] 
General covenants 2.977*** 4.391*** 3.650*** 4.778*** 
 
[2.600] [3.944] [3.071] [4.155] 
Bank return on assets -122.122*** -145.424*** -106.058*** -136.443*** 
 
[-4.222] [-4.828] [-3.457] [-4.343] 
Bank size 0.032 0.152 0.240 0.210 
 
[0.074] [0.370] [0.523] [0.487] 
NPLs 85.330*** 114.555*** 42.693 91.663*** 
 
[3.186] [4.100] [1.543] [3.120] 
Firm return on assets -78.797** -101.188*** -86.039*** -109.857*** 
 
[-2.500] [-3.950] [-2.725] [-4.178] 
Tobin’s Q -27.077*** -30.310*** -23.352*** -27.680*** 
 
[-7.602] [-9.093] [-6.747] [-8.320] 
Firm leverage 157.449*** 139.339*** 142.568*** 130.344*** 
 
[9.989] [9.790] [9.966] [9.169] 
GDP per capita -0.003** -0.000 -0.009** -0.009*** 
 [-2.166] [-0.162] [-2.543] [-2.988] 
GDP growth -0.677 -1.257 0.189 0.831 
 [-0.697] [-1.220] [0.079] [0.388] 
Constant 277.959*** 343.815*** 295.334*** 357.737*** 
 [12.753] [14.415] [12.449] [13.905] 
Observations 27,396 27,396 27,396 27,396 
Adj. R-squared 0.747 0.725 0.756 0.730 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 528 528 528 528 
Number of firms 3989 3989 3989 3989 
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Table A10. Timing of the downgrade event 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The distinguishing feature is the inclusion of Event distance (i.e., the 
distance between the loan facility start date and the corporate credit rating downgrade within the year). Dependent variable is 
AISD and all variables are defined in Table A1. Estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. The penultimate 
part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The lower part of the table denotes the number of 
unique lenders (Number of banks) and borrowers (Number of firms) entering each specification. In specifications (1) and (4), 
Event distance is a continuous variable measuring the days between the loan facility start date and the corporate credit rating 
downgrade. In specifications (2) and (5), Event distance is a continuous variable measuring the quarters between the loan facility 
start date and the corporate credit rating downgrade. In specifications (3) and (6), Event distance is a binary variable equal to one 
if the corporate credit rating downgrade occurred 6 months before the loan facility start date, and zero otherwise. The *, **, and 
*** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm rating × Firm RW 7.681*** 7.620*** 7.842***    
 
[5.212] [5.187] [5.314]    
Firm rating × Firm NRW 5.310*** 5.302*** 5.340***    
 [3.295] [3.299] [3.319]    
Firm downgrade × Firm RW    8.495*** 8.179*** 9.832*** 
    [3.261] [2.995] [4.335] 
Firm downgrade × Firm NRW    7.219** 6.777* 9.053*** 
    [2.046] [1.805] [3.252] 
Event distance 0.005 0.823 -3.133 0.008 1.070 -10.052 
 [1.047] [1.607] [-0.658] [0.735] [0.857] [-1.368] 
Observations 27,396 27,396 27,396 24,114 24,114 24,114 
Adj. R-squared 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.716 0.716 0.716 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 528 528 528 528 528 528 
Number of firms 3989 3989 3989 3989 3989 3989 
 
 
 
